Huckleberry Associates, Inc. v. South Whitehall Township Zoning Hearing Board
120 A.3d 1110
Pa. Commw. Ct.2015Background
- Huckleberry Associates owns 63.7 acres in South Whitehall Township in the rural holding (RH) zoning district; historically operated a noncoal surface mine/quarry (pre-existing, nonconforming use).
- In 2000 Huckleberry and the Township executed an agreement (2000 Agreement) permitting limited municipal uses (e.g., temporary leaf stockpiling) and reserving contract disputes to Berks County court.
- DEP issued two permits (2012–2013) authorizing Huckleberry to construct and operate a composting/biosoil (solid waste recycling) facility subject to compliance with local zoning.
- Township inspected after a neighbor’s complaint and found ~11,250 sq ft newly paved for a recycling facility; cited Huckleberry for (a) failing to obtain a zoning permit for a change of use, (b) creating >10,000 sq ft impervious surface without special exception, and (c) operating a non-permitted solid waste recycling use in RH district.
- Zoning Hearing Board (ZHB) denied Huckleberry’s appeal; trial court affirmed. Huckleberry appealed to Commonwealth Court raising preemption, contract, nonconforming-use, and estoppel defenses.
Issues
| Issue | Huckleberry's Argument | Township's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Noncoal Surface Mining Act (via DEP permits) preempts the Ordinance so Huckleberry need not obtain a zoning permit to produce biosoils | DEP permits mean mining-law preemption; local zoning cannot apply | Ordinance enacted under MPC is not displaced; zoning governs location (not operational method); DEP conditioned permits on zoning compliance | Preemption rejected; zoning applies and DEP permits were conditioned on complying with zoning |
| Whether the Solid Waste Management Act preempts the Ordinance | SWMA preempts local regulation of solid waste operations | Ordinance regulates location (land use), not operational manner; SWMA does not preempt zoning controls | Preemption rejected; zoning regulation of facility location is valid |
| Whether the 2000 Agreement allows Huckleberry to operate recycling as stockpiling/storage of mulch/topsoil | 2000 Agreement’s stockpiling/storage language authorizes recycling/stockpile use | Dispute falls within Berks County court jurisdiction per agreement; ZHB lacks jurisdiction; contract language doesn’t contemplate importing institutional/commercial food waste | ZHB correctly declined contract adjudication; agreement does not plainly permit third‑party food-waste recycling |
| Whether the recycling facility is a natural expansion of the preexisting nonconforming mine/quarry use | Recycling is a natural expansion of prior mining/quarry use | Composting/receipt of third‑party food waste is qualitatively different and not a natural expansion | Rejected: third‑party food‑waste processing is not a natural expansion of mining/quarrying |
| Whether Township is estopped from enforcing zoning because it previously stored leaves on the Property | Township’s 13-year leaf storage and contractual permission precludes enforcement | Township’s leaf storage was a limited, contractual right; Township investigated and promptly enforced after complaint; no detrimental reliance shown | Estoppel rejected: contractual leaf storage does not authorize commercial recycling; no reasonable reliance or hardship shown |
Key Cases Cited
- Geryville Materials, Inc. v. Planning Commission of Lower Milford Township, 74 A.3d 322 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (distinguishes local land-use rules regulating location from state preemption of operational regulation)
- Township of Chartiers v. William H. Martin, Inc., 542 A.2d 985 (Pa. 1988) (nonconforming use may be expanded only to accommodate growth of same business activity existing at ordinance enactment)
- Office of Attorney General v. East Brunswick Township, 980 A.2d 720 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (zoning can regulate siting of solid waste facilities because SWMA does not occupy land-use domain)
- In re Brandywine Realty Trust, 857 A.2d 714 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) (standard of review in land‑use appeals where trial court took no additional evidence)