Hoyt Crace v. Robert Herzog
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 14295
| 9th Cir. | 2015Background
- In 2004 a Washington jury convicted Hoyt Crace of attempted second-degree assault (felony) and two misdemeanors after he ran toward a deputy with a sword; the attempted-assault conviction produced a life sentence under Washington’s three-strikes law.
- Crace argued postconviction that trial counsel was ineffective under Strickland for failing to request a jury instruction on unlawful display of a weapon (a lesser included misdemeanor that would not trigger a third strike).
- The Washington Court of Appeals granted relief, finding counsel deficient and prejudice probable; the Washington Supreme Court reversed on prejudice grounds, applying State v. Grier and reasoning that a jury verdict supported by sufficient evidence forecloses a finding that a lesser-offense instruction would have changed the result.
- The federal district court granted habeas relief; the Ninth Circuit (majority) affirmed, holding the Washington Supreme Court unreasonably applied Strickland and, on de novo review, found both deficient performance and Strickland prejudice.
- The Ninth Circuit majority relied on Keeble and Strickland to explain that a jury presented additional lesser-offense options might rationally convict only on the lesser offense; the dissent argued AEDPA deference required affirming the state court because fairminded jurists could disagree.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Crace) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Washington Supreme Court unreasonably applied Strickland’s prejudice prong under AEDPA | Failure to request unlawful-display instruction prejudiced Crace because a reasonable probability existed the jury would have convicted only of that misdemeanor | State: sufficiency of evidence for attempted assault shows no reasonable probability the outcome would differ; state court reasonably read Strickland to bar speculation | Held: Yes — state court’s approach was an unreasonable application of Strickland; AEDPA deference removed on this point |
| Whether, on de novo review, Crace showed Strickland prejudice | Argues evidence (testimony and expert) supported reasonable probability jury would have convicted only of unlawful display | State: jury convicted on greater offense so could not have rationally chosen only the lesser if instructed | Held: De novo — prejudice satisfied; additional instruction could have led to conviction only of the misdemeanor |
| Whether counsel’s failure to request the unlawful-display instruction was deficient performance | Counsel admitted he did not consider requesting it; given stakes (third strike) failing to request was not strategic | State: omission could be strategic or reasonable; no prejudice in any event | Held: De novo — performance objectively unreasonable; not within range of reasonable strategy |
| Whether AEDPA requires affirming the state-court decision | State: fairminded jurists could reasonably reconcile Strickland and Keeble and thus the Washington Supreme Court’s ruling is reasonable | Crace: state court misapplied Strickland by converting prejudice inquiry into a sufficiency inquiry | Held: AEDPA deference removed for prejudice prong because application was objectively unreasonable; Ninth Circuit grants habeas relief on de novo review |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (establishes two-prong ineffective-assistance test: deficient performance and prejudice)
- Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205 (1973) (lesser-included-offense instructions can prevent juries from resolving reasonable doubts by convicting on the greater offense when a lesser fits)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (standard for sufficiency of the evidence review — rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt)
- Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980) (in capital cases, due process may require lesser-included-offense instructions to avoid all-or-nothing coercion)
- Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 (1991) (one lesser-included instruction can suffice to avoid Beck problems; no automatic right to every lesser instruction)
- Breakiron v. Horn, 642 F.3d 126 (3d Cir. 2011) (rejecting state-court rule that sufficiency alone forecloses prejudice in lesser-instruction Strickland claims)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (AEDPA requires deference to state-court decisions unless their application of clearly established law is objectively unreasonable)
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (Strickland prejudice inquiry focuses on whether counsel’s errors rendered the proceeding unreliable)
