214 A.3d 1128
Md.2019Background
- Travis Howell, a federal cooperant, testified before a state grand jury in 2012 and agreed in his federal plea to cooperate and testify in future prosecutions.
- Howell was subpoenaed to testify at Freddie Curry's 2016 state murder trial; he invoked the Fifth Amendment and was then granted use and derivative-use immunity and ordered to testify under CJ §9-123.
- Howell continued to refuse at the trial, claiming fear of reprisal after an alleged courthouse altercation and related threats; the trial court found him in contempt and detained him.
- Howell was later indicted for criminal contempt; at the contempt proceeding he submitted an Agreed Statement of Facts including proffers of: threats/assault outside court, a failure of promised advance notice by a grand jury prosecutor, limited witness protection offered by the State, and expert testimony on retaliation risks.
- The trial court convicted Howell on the agreed facts and imposed a largely suspended sentence; the Court of Special Appeals affirmed, holding Howell failed to generate a duress defense even assuming it were available.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed, deciding it need not rule definitively whether duress is ever available to a witness charged with contempt for refusing to testify because Howell’s proffered evidence did not show a present, imminent, and impending threat required for duress.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a witness prosecuted for contempt for refusing to testify may assert common-law duress based on fear of reprisal | Howell: duress should be available where threats/assaults created a reasonable fear of serious harm | State: duress should be unavailable because recalcitrant witnesses cannot meet immediacy and no-escape elements; public-policy concerns favor excluding the defense | Court: declined to decide broadly whether duress is categorically unavailable to contempt for refusal to testify; unnecessary to resolve here |
| Whether Howell’s proffer generated a duress defense (i.e., some evidence of present, imminent, impending threat and no reasonable escape) | Howell: proffered assault, threats, failure of promised notice, and inadequate protection created some evidence of duress | State: proffer showed at best future risk, not the requisite immediate/impending threat; threats could be considered at sentencing but not as duress defense | Court: held Howell failed to meet the low “some evidence” threshold because the alleged danger was prospective, not present/imminent; duress not generated |
Key Cases Cited
- McMillan v. State, 428 Md. 333 (defining elements of common-law duress and excluding duress for intentional murder)
- Sigma Reproductive Health Center v. State, 297 Md. 660 (discussing necessity/duress distinction)
- Piemonte v. United States, 367 U.S. 556 (noting civic duty to testify and government obligation to protect citizens)
- Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (use/derivative-use immunity and compelled testimony)
- State v. Rice, 447 Md. 594 (power to compel testimony and related procedural issues)
- Dykes v. State, 319 Md. 206 ("some evidence" threshold for jury instructions on defenses)
- United States v. Patrick, 542 F.2d 381 (explaining critical importance of immediacy element in duress defense)
