933 F.3d 1123
9th Cir.2019Background
- Young was convicted in California (2006) of multiple counts including second-degree burglary, grand theft, and selling stolen property; sentenced to 30 years and 8 months.
- California courts affirmed and the state supreme court denied review.
- Young filed a federal § 2254 habeas petition that was denied on the merits.
- He sought authorization in the Ninth Circuit to file a second or successive § 2254 petition, relying on Riley v. California (cell‑phone search rule).
- The Ninth Circuit requested briefing on whether Riley announced a new rule that the Supreme Court has made retroactive for collateral review under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A).
- The panel denied Young’s application, concluding Riley has not been made retroactive by the Supreme Court and Young failed to make a prima facie showing required for authorization.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Riley v. California constitutes a "new rule" made retroactive by the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A) | Riley announced a new constitutional rule (warrant generally required to search cell‑phone data) that the Supreme Court has made retroactive to collateral cases | The Supreme Court has not held Riley retroactive; Young offered no holdings that logically dictate retroactivity | Denied — Riley has not been made retroactive by the Supreme Court; Young did not make the required prima facie showing |
| Whether the alleged Riley‑based claim qualifies for authorization to file a second or successive § 2254 petition | Riley error renders Young’s conviction unconstitutional and the claim was previously unavailable | AEDPA requires the Supreme Court to have made a new rule retroactive before authorization; procedural default of new rules absent retroactivity | Denied — AEDPA bars authorization absent Supreme Court‑made retroactivity |
Key Cases Cited
- Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014) (held warrant generally required to search cell‑phone digital data)
- Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656 (2001) (only the Supreme Court can make a new rule retroactive under § 2244(b)(2)(A))
- Garcia v. United States, 923 F.3d 1242 (9th Cir. 2019) (retrocessivity requires Supreme Court holdings that logically dictate retroactivity)
- Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406 (2007) (new rules apply retroactively on collateral review only if substantive or watershed procedural rules)
- Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (framework for retroactivity of new procedural rules in collateral review)
- Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) (watershed exception to nonretroactivity is extremely narrow)
- Ezell v. United States, 778 F.3d 762 (9th Cir. 2015) (AEDPA limits on second or successive habeas petitions)