Howard v. Spradlin, 562 S.W.3d 281

Owners Dan and Sherolyn Howard sued after a parked pickup fire destroyed a leased grocery building (Family Food) on Dec. 26–27, 2015.
Truck owner Matthew Spradlin parked overnight in the store lot; he had no express permission from the Howards but had parked there previously and believed the store manager (Castle) would not object.
During the night Spradlin’s truck was set on fire by unknown third parties after they allegedly stole firearms, ammo clips, and a toolbox from the truck; the fire spread to and destroyed the building.
No “no trespassing” or “no parking” signs, gates, or locks were present; the Castles (occupants/lessees) stated they did not consider after‑hours parkers to be trespassers and welcomed parking as good for business.
The circuit court granted summary judgment for Spradlin; the Supreme Court of Kentucky standards for summary judgment and negligence (duty, breach, causation, damages) govern review.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was Spradlin a trespasser when he parked overnight?	Spradlin parked without express permission of owners; thus criminal/civil trespass under KRS and liable per se.	Prior habit of parking, no signs or objections, and Castles’ acquiescence created implied license; not a trespasser.	Not a trespasser: customary use and possessors’ acquiescence created implied permission; summary judgment proper.
Did Spradlin breach a duty by parking with valuables inside (foreseeability/breach)?	He should have foreseen theft and arson and taken precautions (moved truck farther or removed items).	Parking legally on the lot did not create a recognizable risk; no breach of ordinary care in merely parking.	No breach shown as a matter of law; parking where permitted is not inherently dangerous; summary judgment appropriate.
Are the unknown thieves’ acts a superseding cause that severs causation?	Even if Spradlin negligent, his conduct set the scene and contributed to loss.	The third‑party criminal act was an unforeseeable, independent superseding intervening cause breaking causation chain.	Thieves’ intentional criminal acts were unforeseeable superseding causes under the facts; any causal chain was broken and summary judgment affirmed.

Lewis v. B & R Corp., 56 S.W.3d 432 (Ky. App. 2001) (summary judgment standard review)
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1991) (nonmoving party must present evidence creating genuine issue)
Scuddy Coal Co. v. Couch, 274 S.W.2d 388 (Ky. 1954) (express or implied invitation defeats trespass status)
Bradford v. Clifton, 379 S.W.2d 249 (Ky. 1964) (habitual use and acquiescence can create license/status of licensee)
Pathways, Inc. v. Hammons, 113 S.W.3d 85 (Ky. 2003) (duty and foreseeability principles)
Shelton v. Kentucky Easter Seals Soc., Inc., 413 S.W.3d 901 (Ky. 2013) (role of foreseeability in duty/breach analysis)
Britton v. Wooten, 817 S.W.2d 443 (Ky. 1991) (third‑party ignition not superseding where defendant created foreseeable fire risk)
Patton v. Bickford, 529 S.W.3d 717 (Ky. 2016) (components of causation: but‑for and proximate causation)
Bruck v. Thompson, 131 S.W.3d 764 (Ky. App. 2004) (third‑party criminal act can be superseding if unforeseeable)
NKC Hosps., Inc. v. Anthony, 849 S.W.2d 564 (Ky. App. 1993) (factors for determining superseding cause)