490 S.W.3d 179
Tex. App.2016Background
- Stephen and Winnie Howard divorced in 1988 after ~9 years of marriage; their agreed divorce decree awarded Winnie “one half of any and all sums related to any vested ... retirement ... plan ... existing by reason of [Stephen]’s employment during the marriage.”
- At divorce, Stephen had 8.5 years of credited HPD service and had made $20,765 in employee contributions to the Houston Police Officers’ Pension System (HPOPS), but was not then vested in HPOPS retirement benefits.
- After the divorce, HPOPS added benefits (DROP and a lump-sum bonus) and, in 1998, Stephen reached 20 years of service and became eligible for vested benefits traceable in part to service earned during the marriage.
- The trial court interpreted the decree to give Winnie one-half of Stephen’s employee payroll contributions made during the marriage (half of $20,765), treating the award as a refund of contributions rather than a share of vested retirement benefits.
- Winnie appealed, arguing the decree awarded one-half of vested retirement benefits traceable to the service credit earned during the marriage (a future contingent interest), not merely one-half of then-existing payroll contributions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Winnie) | Defendant's Argument (Stephen) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper scope of decree awarding “one half of all sums related to any vested ... retirement ... existing by reason of [employment] during the marriage” | Decree grants Winnie one-half of vested retirement benefits that later vest and that are traceable to service/contributions earned during the marriage | Decree limited to benefits "vested" as of divorce — i.e., only a refund of employee payroll contributions available at divorce | Court held decree awards one-half of vested retirement benefits traceable to service during the marriage (not limited to then-existing refunds) |
| Whether "vested" modifies only present refunds or a prospective contingent interest | Winnie: "vested" qualifies the category of plans, but the decree contemplates future vested benefits traceable to marital service | Stephen: "vested" means present vesting at divorce, so award is refund of contributions | Court held the contract language is forward-looking; reading "vested" as only present would render other language surplusage |
Key Cases Cited
- DeGroot v. DeGroot, 369 S.W.3d 918 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012) (standard of review for post-divorce enforcement/clarification)
- Gainous v. Gainous, 219 S.W.3d 97 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006) (QDROs and post-decree enforcement principles)
- Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1983) (contracts incorporated into divorce decrees interpreted like ordinary contracts)
- FPL Energy v. TXU Portfolio Mgmt. Co., 426 S.W.3d 59 (Tex. 2014) (give effect to clear contract language; unambiguous contracts enforced as written)
- Plains Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Torch Energy Advisors, 473 S.W.3d 296 (Tex. 2015) (avoid contract interpretations that render language surplusage)
- Shanks v. Treadway, 110 S.W.3d 444 (Tex. 2003) (use of record to interpret ambiguous decrees)
- Quijano v. Quijano, 347 S.W.3d 345 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011) (QDROs as post-divorce enforcement orders)
- Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 74 (Tex. 2011) (grammatical principle that an adjective in a series modifies each item)