Howard, Michael D. A/K/A Howard, Michael David
PD-1011-15
Tex. App.Aug 7, 2015Background
- Michael D. Howard was arrested for DWI after a traffic stop; he refused breath testing and at the hospital a mandatory, warrantless blood draw was taken under Tex. Transp. Code § 724.012(b)(3)(B) (repeat-offender provision).
- Howard moved to suppress the blood-test results on Fourth Amendment (and alternatively Texas Constitution) grounds; the trial court denied suppression and he was convicted and sentenced to 16 years.
- The First Court of Appeals reversed, holding the mandatory, warrantless blood draw under § 724.012(b)(3)(B) was not a valid exception to the warrant requirement and suppression of the blood results was required.
- The State petitioned the Court of Criminal Appeals, arguing (1) the draw was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and (2) even if not, federal and Texas exclusionary rules do not require suppression because officers acted in good faith relying on binding statute and precedent.
- The opinion discusses interplay among Schmerber and McNeely Fourth Amendment precedent, the scope of implied-consent/mandatory-collection statutes, and whether good-faith exceptions or Texas Art. 38.23 bar suppression.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a warrantless mandatory blood draw under Tex. Transp. Code § 724.012(b)(3)(B) is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment | Howard: The mandatory, nonconsensual blood draw violated the Fourth Amendment and is not saved by implied-consent or mandatory-collection statutes | State: The mandatory-collection statute authorizes a reasonable search; officers reasonably relied on statute and controlling caselaw | Court of Appeals: § 724.012(b)(3)(B) does not constitute a recognized exception; warrantless mandatory draw was unreasonable (reversed trial court) |
| Whether the federal exclusionary rule permits admission when officers relied in good faith on a presumptively valid statute | Howard: Good-faith reliance on an invalid statute does not permit admission | State: Officer relied in objective good faith on statute and binding judicial precedent, so suppression is unwarranted under federal good-faith doctrines | Court of Appeals: Federal good-faith exceptions do not save the evidence in this statutory context |
| Whether Texas Art. 38.23 exclusionary rule permits admission when officers relied on statute/case law | Howard: Art. 38.23 requires suppression of evidence obtained in violation of constitutional provisions | State: Art. 38.23 contains a limited good-faith exception (warrant) and should not mandate suppression here | Court of Appeals: Art. 38.23's plain text precludes the State's proposed good-faith statute-based exception; suppression required |
| Remedy / Harmless-error | Howard: Admission of blood evidence obtained without warrant was harmful and requires reversal | State: Any error was harmless given toxicology and eyewitness testimony | Court of Appeals: Error was harmful; conviction reversed and remanded for new trial |
Key Cases Cited
- Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013) (natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not create a per se exigency; exigency must be evaluated case-by-case)
- Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (warrantless blood draw is a search; may be reasonable under exigent circumstances)
- Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987) (recognized a good-faith exception to the federal exclusionary rule when officers reasonably rely on statute later declared unconstitutional)
- Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011) (holding that reasonable reliance on binding precedent can support a federal good-faith exception to suppression)
- Keehn v. State, 279 S.W.3d 330 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (Texas court declined to reach a state-constitutional argument where federal analysis resolved the case)