59 N.E.3d 984
Ind. Ct. App.2016Background
- Around 2:00 a.m. on April 25, 2013, Gutenstein stopped his car in the right travel lane of I‑94, turned off its lights, exited the vehicle, and was observed walking near the ditch; shortly thereafter a chain‑reaction crash killed trucker Steve Lunn.
- Troopers at the scene smelled alcohol on Gutenstein, observed glassy/bloodshot eyes and slow speech, handcuffed him, read Miranda and an implied‑consent warning, and transported him to a hospital for a blood draw.
- At the hospital Gutenstein verbally acknowledged the warnings, the word “YES” was circled on an implied‑consent form, and a blood sample (0.13% ethanol) was taken; the officer testified he mistakenly signed portions of the form himself.
- The State charged Gutenstein with (1) OWI causing death (Class C felony), (2) reckless homicide (Class C felony), and (3) OWI (misdemeanor). Gutenstein moved to dismiss Counts I–II and to suppress the blood evidence.
- The trial court denied both motions; on interlocutory appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the informations were not facially deficient, issues of causation and operation were for the jury, and the blood draw was supported by voluntary consent and/or lawful authority under state law.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Gutenstein's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Motion to dismiss — specificity of charging informations | Informations sufficiently track statutes and probable‑cause materials (filed with info) supply factual detail; amendment, not dismissal, is the remedy if any defect exists | Informations failed to allege time of operation and essential facts tying blood test to operation (3‑hour rule), so counts facially defective | Denied — informations not facially deficient; probable cause affidavit and hearing evidence supply needed factual context |
| Motion to dismiss — reckless homicide (sufficiency as matter of law) | A jury could find stopping a car in a travel lane at night and turning lights off is a substantial deviation supporting reckless homicide | Stopping and exiting the vehicle could be non‑reckless; similar conduct (other drivers also stopped) shows not a gross deviation | Denied — court: factual dispute for jury; conduct may be reckless as alleged |
| Motion to dismiss — causation & operation (OWI causing death) | State: operation need not be contemporaneous if intoxication and prior operation put vehicle in position creating foreseeable risk; proximate cause is jury question | Defendant: not operating at collision, vehicle not involved, so cannot be proximate cause as matter of law | Denied — proximate cause/foreseeability questions for jury; operation can include placing vehicle in position posing significant risk |
| Motion to suppress — blood draw (Fourth Amendment & Ind. Const. art. I, §11) | Consent was knowingly and voluntarily given (verbal assent, warnings read, no objection); officer had probable cause from crash, odor, appearance; implied‑consent procedures and exigency considerations support lawfulness | Consent was coerced (custody, handcuffs, officer error signing forms, police instruction to obtain blood), so no valid voluntary consent; warrantless draw violates federal and state constitutional protections | Denied — appellate court defers to trial court credibility findings: consent found voluntary under totality; officer had probable cause and law enforcement interests were high; no Article 1, §11 violation shown |
Key Cases Cited
- Abney v. State, 766 N.E.2d 1175 (Ind. 2002) (discusses proximate cause requirement for OWI‑causing‑death convictions)
- Micinski v. State, 487 N.E.2d 150 (Ind. 1985) (analysis emphasizing focus on driver’s acts for causation)
- Bowman v. State, 564 N.E.2d 309 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (foreseeability/natural and probable consequence standard for proximate cause)
- Whitaker v. State, 778 N.E.2d 423 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (limits on using slight traffic deviations to sustain reckless homicide)
- Garcia‑Torres v. State, 949 N.E.2d 1229 (Ind. 2011) (voluntariness of consent under totality of the circumstances; Miranda not dispositive)
- Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016) (blood draws are searches; consent can be inferred from context)
- Robinson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 362 (Ind. 2014) (Article 1, §11 analysis; reasonableness under totality of circumstances)
- Laker v. State, 939 N.E.2d 1111 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (charging instrument may be evaluated with attached probable‑cause affidavit)
- Thurman v. State, 602 N.E.2d 548 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (consent given in an intimidating atmosphere may be mere submission and involuntary)