Houston Professional Towing Ass'n v. City of Houston
812 F.3d 443
5th Cir.2016Background
- Houston enacted SafeClear (2004) to remove stalled/wrecked vehicles from freeways; City contracted with selected tow companies to operate around the clock.
- HPTA (association of local tow operators, none contracted) sued twice before: SafeClear I (2005) resulted in partial preemption findings; City revised the ordinance; SafeClear II (2008) held the amended program not preempted and rejected HPTA’s commercial-speech claims.
- City made further minor amendments: 2009 clarified solicitation at accident scenes (must wait until police depart); 2011 shifted payment for shoulder (stalled) to vehicle owners and set a $50 rate for SafeClear shoulder tows.
- HPTA filed a third suit (2011 amendments), alleging federal preemption under 49 U.S.C. § 14501 and First Amendment commercial-speech violations; City asserted res judicata.
- The district court granted summary judgment for the City, holding HPTA’s claims barred by res judicata because the operative facts and ordinance purpose remained the same as in SafeClear II; this appeal followed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 14501 preempts the 2011 SafeClear amendments | 2011 amendments (fee shift to owners) materially changed program facts and undermined safety purpose, so preemption claim is new | Amendments are not significant; program’s safety purpose and applicability to non-consent tows unchanged; res judicata bars relitigation | Res judicata bars HPTA’s preemption claim; no significant factual or legal change and non-consent exception applies |
| Whether the safety exception to § 14501 applies | Shifting costs reduced SafeClear responses and harmed safety (expert: fewer shoulder tows) | City’s evidence shows rapid response times and no statistically significant increase in collisions attributable to fee change | Court finds City’s evidence rebuts HPTA; HPTA’s speculation insufficient to show loss of safety nexus |
| Whether the § 14501(c)(2)(C) non-consent exception is implicated | (Implicit) fee rule affects all tows and thus may be preempted | 2011 amendments apply only to non-consent (police-requested) tows, which § 14501 allows local regulation of | Held that non-consent exception independently precludes preemption challenge |
| Whether the 2009 solicitation amendment violates commercial-speech rights | Narrower language (must wait until police depart) increases restriction on solicitation and creates a new First Amendment claim | Change is clarifying only; prohibition on solicitation during police activity existed before; no significant change | Res judicata bars the First Amendment claim; amendment is not materially different for the constitutional analysis |
Key Cases Cited
- Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (res judicata preclusion principle for relitigation)
- Petro-Hunt, L.L.C. v. United States, 365 F.3d 385 (transactional test / nucleus of operative facts)
- VRC LLC v. City of Dallas, 460 F.3d 607 (safety nexus and economic-burden considerations under § 14501)
- City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 424 (municipal safety regulation can avoid § 14501 preemption)
- Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 718 F.3d 460 (elements of res judicata and claim preclusion)