Houston Community College v. Sabrina Lewis, 01-19-00626-CV

Dr. Sabrina Lewis, an African American, served as Director of HCC’s Veterans Affairs (VA) Department from 2009 until termination in October 2015.
Beginning in 2014–2015 Lewis received a PIP, faced internal complaints (including Hembree’s discrimination complaint and a later incident with employee Brandi Maynard), and was placed on administrative leave after the September 15, 2015 altercation with Maynard.
OIE investigated Hembree’s complaint and found facts supporting discrimination against Lewis; HR and supervisors (Morris, Bagherpour, Porcarello, Anderson) recommended removal/termination based on cumulative performance and conduct issues.
Lewis alleges she reported misuse of a VA “B‑Code” (improper veteran benefit assignments) to the Texas Veterans Commission and the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs in late 2014/early 2015 and claims HCC terminated her in retaliation (Texas Whistleblower Act) and because of race (Chapter 21/§ 1981).
Federal court dismissed Lewis’s § 1981 claim and remanded state claims; HCC filed a plea to the jurisdiction which the trial court denied; the Court of Appeals reversed, holding Lewis failed to establish jurisdictional elements for both claims and rendering judgment dismissing her claims for lack of jurisdiction.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Race discrimination under TCHRA	Lewis: presented direct and circumstantial evidence (statements, comparators, temporary takeover of duties) showing discriminatory motive	HCC: no direct proof; no prima facie circumstantial case—permanent replacement was same race and proposed comparators were not "nearly identical"	Court: No direct evidence; failed prima facie proof (no valid comparator, replacement was African American); plea to jurisdiction should have been granted and race claim dismissed
Whistleblower Act retaliation	Lewis: she reported B‑Code misuse to TVC/USVA and that was the but‑for cause of termination	HCC: Lewis did not show report to appropriate authority was known to decisionmakers; long temporal gap; no causal link; alternatives (exhaustion, good‑faith) not met	Court: Decisionmaker (Maldonado/Anderson) lacked knowledge of external reports; temporal gap too long and no evidence of causation or conduit influence; plea to jurisdiction should have been granted and whistleblower claim dismissed

Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004) (standard for plea to jurisdiction based on evidence)
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (U.S. 1973) (burden‑shifting framework for circumstantial discrimination claims)
Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755 (Tex. 2018) (direct‑evidence vs. circumstantial‑evidence analysis)
City of Fort Worth v. Zimlich, 29 S.W.3d 62 (Tex. 2000) (factors for causation in Whistleblower Act cases)
Office of Attorney Gen. v. Rodriguez, 605 S.W.3d 183 (Tex. 2020) (Whistleblower Act causation and employer’s right to make later employment decisions)
Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d 629 (Tex. 2012) (waiver of governmental immunity and pleading facts to invoke statutory remedies)
Tex. Tech Univ. Health Scis. Ctr.–El Paso v. Flores, 612 S.W.3d 299 (Tex. 2020) (requirements for "similarly situated" comparator analysis)
AutoZone, Inc. v. Reyes, 272 S.W.3d 588 (Tex. 2008) (elements of prima facie discrimination under McDonnell Douglas)
Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Hinds, 904 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1995) (Whistleblower Act principles on employer motives and termination)