Housing Authority of the County of Lake v. Lake County Zoning Board of Appeals
2017 IL App (2d) 160959
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2017Background
- Midlothian Manor, a vacant 14-unit building in unincorporated Lake County (zoned R-1), was owned by the Lake County Housing Authority; plaintiffs (the Authority and PADS) sought to house PADS’s Safe Haven program there to serve chronically homeless individuals.
- Department staff initially thought the use required a conditional-use permit (assisted living), but Department deputy director suggested classifying it as a "government use," a permitted use in R-1 if there is no assembly space.
- Director Waggoner issued a change‑in‑use permit classifying the project as "government use (no assembly space)," relying on (1) Authority ownership and statutory powers to contract, and (2) his interpretation that Midlothian Manor’s common areas were not "assembly space."
- Neighbors (defendants) administratively appealed; after a three‑day hearing the Lake County Zoning Board of Appeals reversed the Director (5–1), citing multiple rationales (ownership/lease issues, presence of assembly space, or that the use was actually group living).
- The circuit court reversed the Board and reinstated the change‑in‑use permit; the Appellate Court reviews whether the Board’s reversal of the Director was clearly erroneous.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Authority/PADS) | Defendant's Argument (Neighbors) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the proposed use qualifies as a "government use" under the Unified Development Ordinance | Authority may lease to PADS and such lease/use furthers the Authority’s statutory purposes; that satisfies the ordinance definition because the Authority owns the building and the use exercises statutory authority | "Government use" requires the government to own or be lessee and to directly use the property in exercising statutory authority; leasing to a private NGO means it is not a government use | Held for plaintiffs: definition allows owner‑government to lease to a private operator when the lease/use effectuates the government unit’s statutory authority; Director’s classification was permissible (de novo interpretation where needed; mixed‑question review generally clearly erroneous standard) |
| Whether the property contains "assembly space" (thereby changing permissible classification and use restrictions) | Director: "assembly space" means space used for formal gatherings (public/social/educational/religious); Midlothian’s common areas are for residents and not formal public assembly, so no assembly space exists | Neighbors: director imported a public‑access requirement and ignored ordinary meaning; common areas are assembly space | Held for plaintiffs: court reads "assembly space" by its plain meaning (group gathered for a particular purpose); Midlothian’s common areas do not meet that definition; Board’s findings on assembly space were clearly erroneous |
| Whether Director erred by not consulting Appendix F or other non‑regulatory guidance | Plaintiffs: Appendix F is informational; the specific use table (§151.111) controls; Director need not follow appendix F | Neighbors: Director should have used Appendix F, which categorizes "government use" as nonresidential and supports forbidding the use in R‑1 | Held for plaintiffs: specific use table controls over Appendix F; Director’s reliance on the ordinance text was proper |
| Whether the Board reasonably reclassified the use (e.g., group living or assisted living) instead of deferring to Director’s classification | Plaintiffs: Director’s "government use (no assembly space)" classification is consistent with the Act and Ordinance; Board limited its review to whether Director erred and did not adopt an alternative classification | Neighbors: Board could and should have reclassified as group living (a prohibited R‑1 use) or assisted living and thus deny the permit | Held for plaintiffs: Board reversed without a majority rationale or agreed alternative classification; because the Board simply overturned the Director rather than definitively reclassifying, its decision was not entitled to deference on an alternative ground and was reversed |
Key Cases Cited
- Goodman v. Ward, 241 Ill. 2d 398 (Illinois 2011) (standard for reviewing administrative mixed questions of fact and law; "clearly erroneous" vs. de novo)
- Lombard Public Facilities Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 378 Ill. App. 3d 921 (Ill. App. 2008) (agency experience and expertise warrant deference under the clearly erroneous standard)
- Barbara’s Sales, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 227 Ill. 2d 45 (Ill. 2007) (de novo review applies to pure questions of law)
- Hawthorne v. Village of Olympia Fields, 204 Ill. 2d 243 (Ill. 2003) (principles for ordinance/statute interpretation)
- Henderson Square Condominium Ass’n v. LAB Townhomes, LLC, 2015 IL 118139 (Ill. 2015) (use plain language to ascertain legislative intent in ordinance interpretation)
- In re Brandon K., 2017 IL App (2d) 170075 (Ill. App. 2017) (court may not add terms to ordinance language)
- St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. City of Waukegan, 2017 IL App (2d) 160381 (Ill. App. 2017) (judgments may be affirmed on any ground appearing in the record)
- People v. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d 312 (Ill. 2007) (discussion of leasehold and tenant rights in the possession/use context)
- Hartney Fuel Oil Co. v. Hamer, 2013 IL 115130 (Ill. 2013) (deference to agency interpretation when ordinance ambiguous)