160 So. 3d 530
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2015Background
- Wife (Maureen Horowitz) petitioned for final injunction against husband (Sammie Horowitz) alleging cyberstalking and that she reasonably feared imminent domestic violence.
- Alleged cyberstalking consisted of two posts on husband's Facebook page: song lyrics and a screenshot of a private message from wife's Facebook account.
- Wife testified she believed husband had hacked or was spying on her computer, that a keylogger existed on her machine, and that husband said he had someone watching her; she presented no direct evidence husband installed any software.
- The trial court granted the injunction after an evidentiary hearing; husband appealed to the Second District Court of Appeal.
- The appellate court reviewed whether competent, substantial evidence showed (1) actual domestic violence via cyberstalking, or (2) reasonable cause to believe she was in imminent danger of domestic violence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Facebook posts constituted "cyberstalking" (domestic violence) | Horowitz argued posts (lyrics and private-message screenshot) and statements about watching her show cyberstalking causing emotional distress | Sammie argued posts were public posts on his page, not directed at her, and lacked proof he accessed her account or caused substantial emotional distress | Reversed: posts not directed at a specific person and plaintiff’s emotional-distress testimony was conclusory and insufficient; not cyberstalking |
| Whether plaintiff had reasonable cause to believe she was in imminent danger of domestic violence | Horowitz pointed to remote past physical incidents, gestures (finger-gun), blocking doorways, and testimony she feared he would "eventually" hurt her | Sammie argued past incidents were remote and allegations were vague without recent or specific threats or acts creating imminent danger | Reversed: past physical incidents too remote; gestures and vague fear insufficient to show imminent danger |
Key Cases Cited
- Branson v. Rodriguez-Linares, 143 So. 3d 1070 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (explaining cyberstalking as a form of domestic violence and standards for injunction)
- Young v. Young, 96 So. 3d 478 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (acts like changing passwords or appropriating emails are not "electronic communications" directed at a person for cyberstalking)
- Arnold v. Santana, 122 So. 3d 512 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (reversing injunction where texts about tracking did not establish cyberstalking)
- Alderman v. Thomas, 141 So. 3d 668 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (vague, conclusory testimony of fear is insufficient to support injunction)
- Gill v. Gill, 50 So. 3d 772 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (isolated remote incidents of domestic violence generally do not support injunction absent recent conduct)
- Jones v. Jones, 32 So. 3d 772 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (reversing injunction where prior pushing incident years earlier and non-specific statements did not show imminent threat)