Hornish Trust v. King County, 899 F.3d 680

In 1997 BNSF conveyed the Eastside Rail Corridor to The Land Conservancy of Seattle & King County (TLC); TLC and King County railbanked the corridor under the Trails Act and King County later received a quitclaim deed and developed a trail.
Plaintiffs are abutting landowners (including the Hornish trust and several other families/LLC) who sought a declaratory judgment under Wash. Rev. Code § 7.24.020 claiming fee title or limited surface easement rights in the corridor and disputing its width.
King County counterclaimed to quiet title, asserting it holds (via the quitclaim and the Trails Act) both the original railroad easement and a separate recreational-trail easement; both sides moved for summary judgment.
The district court dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of Article III and statutory standing, granted King County’s summary judgment and quieted title; plaintiffs appealed.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed: it held federal jurisdiction proper under the Grable line (the case necessarily raises a disputed, substantial federal issue), found plaintiffs lacked standing because they had no property interest in the corridor, concluded King County holds the railroad and recreational easements, and determined the corridor is generally 100 feet wide (with limited exceptions).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Federal jurisdiction ("arising under")	Trails Act issue is only a defense; federal courts lack jurisdiction	Federal issue (Trails Act) is necessarily raised and disputed by the complaint	Federal jurisdiction exists under Grable/Gunn tests; all four factors satisfied
Standing to seek declaratory relief	Abutting owners (Hornish & others) have property interests (fee or reversion) and justiciable controversy	Plaintiffs lack property interests in corridor so no injury; therefore no Article III or statutory standing	Plaintiffs lack Article III and statutory standing; AC dismissed
Effect of the Trails Act on property interests	Railbanking converts railroad easement into a new limited trail easement that replaces prior railroad easement	Trails Act preserves original railroad easement (prevents state-law abandonment) and creates an additional trail easement; both survive	Trails Act preserved the railroad easement and created a separate recreational easement; both conveyed to King County
Width and ownership of corridor	Actual historic use shows narrow (≈12 ft) operational width; centerline presumption supports abutters' claims to centerline	Historical ICC valuation maps, assessor records, and other evidence show a 100-ft right‑of‑way (with limited 50–75 ft exceptions)	Corridor is 100 ft wide generally (50 ft by Morel property; ~75 ft for Menezes/Vanderwende); plaintiffs’ evidence insufficient; centerline presumption inapplicable

Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005) (establishes test for federal jurisdiction over state-law claims that necessarily raise substantial federal issues)
Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251 (2013) (clarifies four-factor Grable test for federal "arising under" jurisdiction)
Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 494 U.S. 1 (1990) (describes congressional purposes of the Trails Act and rails-to-trails framework)
King County v. Rasmussen, 299 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2002) (construed Hilchkanum deed to convey fee to the railroad; binding on panel here)
Roeder Co. v. Burlington Northern, 716 P.2d 855 (Wash. 1986) (recognizes Washington "centerline presumption" and its limits)
Kershaw Sunnyside Ranches, Inc. v. Yakima Interurban Lines Ass’n, 126 P.3d 16 (Wash. 2006) (refines analysis for when "right of way" language creates an easement presumption)
Brown v. State, 924 P.2d 908 (Wash. 1996) (multifactor test for determining whether conveyance transferred fee or easement)
Caldwell v. United States, 391 F.3d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (explains Trails Act preclusion of state-law abandonment and relation to takings claims)