Horne v. Department of Agriculture
135 S. Ct. 2419
| SCOTUS | 2015Background
- The USDA California Raisin Marketing Order required growers in certain years to set aside a percentage of their crop as "reserve raisins" for the Government; the Raisin Administrative Committee (a government entity) then sold or otherwise disposed of them.
- In 2002–2003 the reserve rate was 47%; in 2003–2004 it was 30%. Proceeds (after export subsidies and expenses) were distributed to growers, but in the relevant years proceeds were negligible or zero.
- Petitioners Marvin and Laura Horne were both raisin growers and handlers who refused to set aside reserve raisins; the Government fined them the market value of the missing raisins and imposed civil penalties.
- Hornes challenged the reserve requirement as an uncompensated taking under the Fifth Amendment. This Court in Horne I held the Hornes could raise a takings defense in court; on remand the Ninth Circuit treated the requirement as a regulatory condition, not a per se physical taking.
- The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding the reserve requirement is a physical taking of personal property requiring just compensation, and ordered that the fines and penalties be vacated (declining to remand to compute compensation because the Government had itself assessed market-value fines).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Horne) | Defendant's Argument (US) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the per se rule for physical takings applies only to real property | The categorical rule covers personal property too; direct appropriation of raisins is a per se taking | The per se rule applies to real property only; personal property offers less protection | Held: per se rule applies to personal property — physical appropriation requires compensation |
| Whether reserving a contingent interest in proceeds defeats a taking claim | Retained contingent interest in net proceeds (discretionary and possibly worthless) does not avoid a taking | Reserve-distribution scheme leaves growers with the key economic interest, so no taking | Held: contingent/discretionary interest does not defeat a physical-taking claim |
| Whether requiring surrender of specific goods as a market condition is a per se taking | Conditioning market participation on surrendering a percentage of identifiable raisins effects a per se taking | Participation in regulated markets is voluntary; growers can avoid requirement by planting other crops or selling in other forms | Held: imposing a requirement to relinquish specific, identifiable property as a condition on commerce can be a per se taking (Loretto controls) |
| Remedy / remand: should case be remanded to calculate compensation or set off regulatory benefits? | Hornes contend they need not pay fines; Government already valued the raisins when assessing fines | Government asks remand to allow calculation of benefits to remaining crop and other offsets (Bauman line) | Held: No remand — Hornes relieved of the assessed fines and penalties because the Government had already quantified market-value fine; broader setoff issues not decided here |
Key Cases Cited
- Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (physical occupation of property is a per se taking requiring compensation)
- Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002) (distinguishes physical takings from regulatory takings; physical possession triggers categorical duty to compensate)
- Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (ad hoc multi-factor test for regulatory takings)
- Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (regulatory takings doctrine: regulation can go "too far")
- Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (total deprivation of economically beneficial use is a per se taking)
- Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (prohibition on sale of artifacts was not a taking where possession and other rights remained)
- Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (conditioning market access on disclosure of trade secrets was not a taking where the disclosure was part of regulatory scheme)
- Leonard & Leonard v. Earle, 279 U.S. 392 (1929) (state could exact a percentage of oyster shells as a condition of doing business; treated as privilege tax rather than taking)
- Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548 (1897) (benefits to remaining property may be set off against compensation for part taken)
- United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24 (1984) (just compensation normally measured by market value at time of taking)
- Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (nexus requirement for land-use exactions)
- Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (rough proportionality requirement for land-use exactions)
- PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (regulation limiting exclusion rights may not constitute a taking under Penn Central)