Horn v. Commissioner of Correction
138 A.3d 908
| Conn. | 2016Background
- In 1999 Vernon Horn and codefendant Marquis Jackson robbed the Dixwell Deli in New Haven; Horn was convicted (after a joint jury trial) of multiple counts including felony murder and sentenced to 70 years. The Appellate Court affirmed on direct appeal.
- Horn filed a habeas petition claiming trial counsel Leo Ahern rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate (1) who possessed a cell phone stolen in the robbery and (2) witnesses/evidence that would undermine accomplice Steven Brown’s timeline placing Horn with Brown before, during, and after the crime.
- At the criminal trial the state introduced cell‑phone call records and testimony from Brown and Pearson connecting Horn to possession/use of the stolen phone; Brown pleaded guilty and had an incentive to cooperate.
- At the habeas trial Horn introduced recantations and new testimony (Sadler, Sykes, Newkirk, Jenkins’ prior testimony, Pearson’s recantation) intended to show the stolen phone remained in Bridgeport and that Horn had alibis or was not with Brown as the state claimed.
- The habeas court found counsel’s investigation failures were deficient and prejudicial with respect to the cell‑phone issue, granted relief, and set aside Horn’s conviction. The Commissioner appealed.
- The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed: it held counsel’s failure to develop the cell‑phone evidence and other investigatory lapses, though deficient, were not prejudicial under Strickland because the new evidence was weak/cumulative and other trial evidence still supported the conviction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Horn) | Defendant's Argument (Commissioner) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether counsel’s failure to investigate cell‑phone leads was prejudicial under Strickland | Failure to discover witnesses and evidence showing the stolen phone stayed in Bridgeport undermines Brown’s/Pearson’s trial testimony and creates reasonable probability of different result | Even assuming deficiency, the habeas‑trial evidence about the phone was weak/confusing/cumulative and would not have undermined confidence in the verdict | No prejudicial effect; habeas court erred in granting relief on this ground |
| Whether counsel’s failure to investigate witnesses undermining Brown’s timeline was prejudicial | New alibi/witness testimony showed Horn was in New Haven 2–3 a.m., contradicting Brown’s account and would have undercut prosecution theory | New testimony was cumulative of defense evidence at trial and inconsistent with multiple eyewitnesses and investigative facts; no reasonable probability of different verdict | No prejudice; failure to investigate was not outcome‑determinative |
| Whether state’s use of (allegedly) perjured testimony violated due process | Brown and Pearson perjured themselves; their testimony was material and deprived Horn of a fair trial | Petitioner has not proved perjury conclusively; even excluding their testimony, other evidence supports conviction | Rejected; petitioner failed to show due process violation or reasonable likelihood of a different outcome |
| Whether Horn established freestanding actual innocence | Habeas evidence (recantations, alibi witnesses) affirmatively proves Horn could not have committed the crime | New evidence is not irrefutable; timelines are approximate and other evidence still permits guilt finding | Rejected; petitioner did not clear the high clear‑and‑convincing, no‑reasonable‑juror standard for actual innocence |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishing two‑prong ineffective assistance test: performance and prejudice)
- Bryant v. Commissioner of Correction, 290 Conn. 502 (Connecticut application of Strickland standards)
- Gould v. Commissioner of Correction, 301 Conn. 544 (standard for freestanding actual innocence and skepticism toward recantations)
- Ortega v. Duncan, 333 F.3d 102 (2d Cir.) (standard for due process violation from use of false testimony without prosecutorial knowledge)
- United States v. Persico, 645 F.3d 85 (2d Cir.) (new or cumulative evidence that merely bolsters prior doubts is not material for retrial)
- State v. Jackson, 73 Conn. App. 338 (App. Ct.) (direct‑appeal decision describing trial evidence and convictions)
