Hopper v. State
2017 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 531
| Tex. Crim. App. | 2017Background
- 1993: Harris County charged appellant with aggravated sexual assault; warrant and detainer were filed while appellant later went to Nebraska and was incarcerated there.
- 1995: Appellant was convicted and sentenced in Nebraska; on May 5, 1995 he signed a form notifying him of the Texas detainer and his right under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) but he did not invoke the IAD.
- 1995–2013: Harris County did not initiate an IAD transfer; the case remained untried for over 18 years while appellant served Nebraska sentences.
- Sept.–Oct. 2013: Harris County filed an IAD request; appellant refused to sign extradition/waiver paperwork and was transferred to Texas in October 2013.
- 2014–2015: Appellant moved to dismiss for violation of the Sixth Amendment speedy-trial right; the trial court denied the motion and appellant pleaded guilty in exchange for 30 years.
- Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, agreeing with the court of appeals generally but holding the long delay’s reasons-for-delay factor was neutral because both parties were equally blameworthy for the post-1995 delay (defendant for not invoking IAD; State for not initiating IAD sooner).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether defendant’s failure to invoke the IAD should be charged to him under Barker’s reasons-for-delay factor | Harris County: defendant knew of IAD rights and could have demanded transfer; his inaction should be charged to him | Hopper: defendant signed a complex form without counsel and should not be penalized; primary burden is on State | Held: Defendant’s failure to invoke IAD contributed to delay; but because State also failed to act, both parties are equally to blame for the period 1995–2013, so reasons-for-delay is neutral |
| Whether Barker’s assertion-of-right factor weighs against defendant | State: defendant sat on his rights for >18 years and refused extradition waiver, so he did not assert a speedy-trial right | Hopper: argued the IAD notice was legally inadequate and he lacked counsel when it was signed | Held: Assertion-of-right weighs heavily against defendant — record supports that he knew of the charge and the IAD remedy but did not pursue it |
| Whether defendant proved prejudice from the long delay sufficient to show Sixth Amendment violation | Hopper: lengthy delay itself and lost/destroyed evidence likely impaired defense | State: defendant acquiesced in delay and offered no particularized prejudice or defensive theory | Held: Prejudice factor does not favor defendant — no particularized proof, acquiescence reduced presumptive prejudice |
| Whether State acted in bad faith in delaying prosecution | Hopper argued State prioritized other cases and knowingly let evidence/witnesses go, showing bad faith | State said delay was due to resource/prioritization and IAD considerations, not tactical delay | Held: No evidence of bad-faith tactical delay; prioritization and resource judgments do not establish bad faith |
Key Cases Cited
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (balancing test for Sixth Amendment speedy-trial claims)
- Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (prejudice presumption from negligent government delay; bad-faith delay weighed heavily against government)
- Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (state must make diligent, good-faith effort to bring an out-of-state prisoner to trial where demand exists)
- Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81 (speedy-trial balancing is amorphous; consider conduct of both prosecution and defendant)
- Dragoo v. State, 96 S.W.3d 308 (Tex. Crim. App.) (defendant’s long failure to demand a speedy trial can weigh heavily against him under assertion-of-right factor)