445 P.3d 582
Wyo.2019Background
- On March 14, 2017 Matthew V. Hopkins, an addiction psychiatrist, huffed an air duster and drove; while driving he lost consciousness, veered into oncoming traffic, and collided head-on with another vehicle, causing serious injury. A toxicologist found inhalants in his blood.
- Hopkins admitted prior inhalant use, knew the risks (from professional knowledge and warning labels), and conceded at trial that he drove while intoxicated and unlawfully used a toxic substance.
- The State charged Hopkins with aggravated assault and battery (causing bodily injury with a deadly weapon under Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-502(a)(ii)), DUI causing injury, and unlawful use of a toxic substance; a jury convicted on all counts.
- Hopkins argued on appeal that subsection (a)(ii)’s mental-state element “knowingly” required purposeful conduct to hit the victim (i.e., purposeful use of the car as a weapon), and that he was unconscious at impact so lacked that mens rea; he also claimed the court prevented presentation of his defense and erred in jury instructions.
- The district court excluded Hopkins’ proposed theory that “knowingly” means “purposefully,” instructed with the general intent pattern instruction, and the jury convicted; Hopkins appealed asserting statutory misinterpretation, insufficiency of evidence as to mens rea, and due process error in instructions.
Issues
| Issue | Hopkins’ Argument | State’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether “knowingly” in § 6-2-502(a)(ii) requires purposeful conduct to hit the victim | “Knowingly” requires purposeful use of force—State had to prove he purposefully hit the other car; unconscious at impact negates that mens rea | Statute is plain: culpability applies to causing bodily injury with a deadly weapon; general intent satisfied if the act producing the result was voluntary (e.g., voluntarily driving while intoxicated) | Court: “Knowingly” does not require purposeful targeting; voluntary conduct (huffing and driving despite knowledge of risks) supplies the mens rea for (a)(ii) |
| Sufficiency of evidence for aggravated assault and battery | No evidence of intentional or knowing mens rea at time of impact (he was unconscious) | Jury could infer mens rea from his voluntary decision to huff and drive knowing the risks, causing injury | Court: Evidence sufficient; reasonable jury could find he knowingly caused injury by driving while intoxicated |
| Whether exclusion of Hopkins’ defense theory denied due process (failure to give defense-theory instruction) | Excluding instruction that “knowingly” means “purposefully” prevented presentation of complete defense | Proposed theory misstated the law; court may exclude instructions that mischaracterize law or suggest uncharged offenses | Court: Plain-error standard—no clear legal rule requiring Hopkins’ instruction; exclusion proper because theory misstated law; no due process violation |
| Whether court erred by giving general intent instruction and refusing Hopkins’ proposed definition of “knowingly” | Proposed instruction defining “knowingly” as “purposefully” was necessary | “Knowingly” is ordinary-language term; pattern general-intent instruction correctly stated the law; trial court has discretion | Court: No abuse of discretion; pattern instruction accurate; refusal to define “knowingly” as “purposefully” was proper |
Key Cases Cited
- Mraz v. State, 378 P.3d 280 (Wyo. 2016) (standard of review for district court legal determinations)
- Adekale v. State, 344 P.3d 761 (Wyo. 2015) (statutory interpretation and presumption that common terms have ordinary meaning)
- Harris v. State, 137 P.3d 124 (Wyo. 2006) (general intent crimes require voluntary act only)
- Barrera v. State, 403 P.3d 1025 (Wyo. 2017) (voluntariness and inference of intent from voluntary conduct)
- Slaughter v. State, 629 P.2d 481 (Wyo. 1981) (intent inferred from voluntary acts)
- Saldana v. State, 685 P.2d 20 (Wyo. 1984) (proscribed conduct must be voluntary to establish liability)
- Guy v. State, 184 P.3d 687 (Wyo. 2008) (standard for sufficiency review—view evidence in light most favorable to the State)
- Tingey v. State, 387 P.3d 1170 (Wyo. 2017) (failure to give a defendant-offered instruction is a due process issue; plain-error review when instruction not offered)