HOPKINS v. LAFORTUNE, 394 P.3d 1283

Background

Petitioner was federally incarcerated in Leavenworth and charged in Tulsa County (two counts of first-degree murder); Oklahoma sought temporary custody under IAD Article IV and petitioner (through federal warden) requested disposition under IAD Article III.
State filed Request for Temporary Custody (Article IV) in February 2016; petitioner’s Article III request (via warden) was dated Feb. 16 and received Feb. 19, 2016. Petitioner was transferred to Tulsa custody March 24, 2016.
Calendar: 120 days from arrival under Article IV would expire July 23, 2016; 180 days from receipt of petitioner’s Article III request would expire Aug. 17, 2016. Petitioner moved to dismiss Aug. 5, 2016 for IAD violation.
District Court found some tolling (June 27–July 11; July 11–Aug 8; Aug 12–15) and focused on whether Article III (180 days) or Article IV (120 days) controlled when both parties initiated transfer. Trial set and hearings continued; petitioner sought extraordinary relief.
Court of Criminal Appeals overruled its prior rule from Ullery and held that when defendant files under Article III, that action implicitly waives the State‑initiated Article IV protections, so Article III’s 180‑day period governs; it calculated tolling and held 45 days remained in the Article III period, denied the writ, lifted stay, and remanded.

Issues

Issue	Petitioner’s Argument	State’s Argument	Held
Which IAD time limit applies when both State (Art. IV) and defendant (Art. III) initiate transfer?	Petitioner argued Article IV 120‑day limit applies because State requested temporary custody first.	State argued tolling saved the 120‑day period and petitioner waived by not timely objecting.	Court held defendant’s Article III filing implicitly and automatically waives any Article IV protections; Article III 180‑day limit governs when both initiated.
Whether tolling justified extending the IAD time limit past the statutory deadline	Petitioner argued the State failed to show "good cause" for tolling and delays were not the defendant’s fault.	State contended multiple periods were tolled as necessary, reasonable continuances and for petitioner’s inaction.	Court found record supported tolling totaling specified periods (13 days; July11–Aug8; plus 3 days), leaving 45 days under Article III.
Whether petitioner waived IAD protections by failing to object to scheduling	Petitioner argued waiver did not occur because no trial date was agreed and protections cannot be forfeited by silence on intermediate settings.	State relied on Hill to argue that accepting treatment inconsistent with IAD time limits (e.g., silence/consent to settings) constitutes waiver.	Court held defendant’s Article III filing operates as waiver of Article IV; court also recognized waiver doctrines (citing Hill) but based ruling on Article III controlling.
Whether extraordinary relief (writ) was warranted to dismiss charges for IAD violation	Petitioner sought prohibition/mandamus to bar proceeding and force dismissal for IAD violation.	State opposed, arguing tolling/waiver preserved jurisdiction and time limits.	Court denied extraordinary writ, granted Ten-Day Rule suspension, lifted stay, and remanded with 45 days remaining to commence trial.

Key Cases Cited

Ullery v. State, 988 P.2d 332 (Okla. Crim. 1999) (prior Oklahoma rule for computing competing Article III/IV time limits, overruled here)
New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110 (2000) (defendant may waive IAD time limits by accepting treatment inconsistent with them)
Matthews v. Kentucky, 168 S.W.3d 14 (Ky. 2005) (adopted approach treating defendant’s Article III filing as controlling over State Article IV request)
Bell v. State, 714 P.2d 205 (Okla. Crim. 1986) (tolling must be supported by record showing good cause)
Gallimore v. State, 944 P.2d 939 (Okla. Crim. 1997) (burden shifts to State to justify failure to try within IAD period)
Skinner v. State, 210 P.3d 840 (Okla. Crim. 2009) (IAD time limits can be waived)
Yellen v. Cooper, 828 F.2d 1471 (10th Cir. 1987) (IAD protections may be waived; not a constitutional right)