Hooman Panah v. Kevin Chappell, 935 F.3d 657

Eight-year-old Nicole Parker disappeared from her apartment complex; her naked body was later found wrapped in a bedsheet and stuffed in a suitcase in Hooman Panah’s bedroom closet.
Panah made incriminating statements to acquaintances (admitting involvement; saying she was dead), left work abruptly after police inquiries, and attempted suicide the morning after the disappearance.
At trial the prosecution presented forensic testimony: coroner Dr. Heuser described severe premortem blunt‑force and sexual injuries; serologist William Moore testified to mixed A/B antigen stains on a bedsheet, robe, and tissue consistent with a mixture of Parker’s and Panah’s bodily fluids.
The jury convicted Panah of first‑degree murder and related sexual offenses, found some special‑circumstance allegations true, and sentenced him to death; the California Supreme Court affirmed and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari.
Post‑conviction DNA reports (2004, 2006) undermined portions of Moore’s serology testimony (conclusively disproving the tissue testimony and calling into question parts of the bedsheet/robe findings).
Panah filed federal habeas petitions alleging (1) Napue due‑process violation based on allegedly false serology testimony and (2) ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to investigate/rebut forensic evidence; district court denied relief and this appeal followed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Due process Napue claim (false testimony)	Moore’s serology testimony (some of which post‑conviction testing proved false) was known or should have been known false and was material to conviction.	Even if portions were false, Moore’s testimony was not material given overwhelming independent evidence (body in closet, admissions, pathology).	Denied — court concluded Moore’s testimony was immaterial to guilt; no Napue relief.
Ineffective assistance (guilt‑phase)	Counsel failed to investigate/retain experts to rebut serology and pathology, focusing instead on settlement, creating prejudice under Strickland.	Even assuming deficient performance, no reasonable probability of different verdict given the strong evidence (body in closet, admissions, Dr. Heuser’s pathology) and effective cross‑examination.	Denied — state court reasonably could find no prejudice; no Strickland relief.

Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) (due‑process violation where prosecution knowingly uses false evidence)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑prong ineffective‑assistance standard: deficient performance + prejudice)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (AEDPA deference in habeas review; standard for unreasonable application)
Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967) (reversal where prosecution relied on evidence later shown to be false and it was an important link in the case)
Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957) (false testimony materially prejudicial when it would have corroborated defense)
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991) (confession is highly probative and damaging evidence)