Hood v. United States
130 Fed. Cl. 232
| Fed. Cl. | 2017Background
- Pro se plaintiff Julian R. Hood challenges OPM’s acceptance of his mother’s March 18, 2002 FEGLI waiver and alleges denial of FEGLI death benefits after her 2013 death.
- Hood pursued administrative reconsideration (denied) and filed multiple suits in various courts (W.D. Mich., S.D.N.Y., Court of Federal Claims) raising substantially the same operative facts and claims.
- Hood’s prior district-court action in the Western District of Michigan (No. 15-609) challenging the waiver was pending (and later dismissed with appeal pending) before he filed the complaint that was transferred to the Court of Federal Claims in this case.
- The Court of Federal Claims dismissed Hood’s initial filing for failure to pay the filing fee; Hood later paid, amended, and refiled claims in this court asserting breach of contract, fiduciary duties, promissory estoppel, unjust enrichment, conversion, and state-law torts.
- The government moved to dismiss under RCFC 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), arguing lack of jurisdiction under the Tucker Act (no money-mandating source) and that jurisdiction is statutorily barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1500 because a related suit was pending in another court.
- The Court dismissed Hood’s complaint, holding § 1500 barred the Court of Federal Claims from exercising jurisdiction because an earlier-filed related case was pending in another court and involved substantially the same operative facts.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Court of Federal Claims has Tucker Act jurisdiction (money-mandating source) | Hood invokes FEGLI and Tucker Act to recover money for denied benefits | Government contends plaintiff fails to identify a money-mandating source or valid contract claim | Not reached as disposition rests on § 1500 bar; court focused on jurisdictional bar under § 1500 |
| Whether 28 U.S.C. § 1500 bars the Court of Federal Claims from hearing the complaint | Hood disputed timing; claimed different filing date or relied on separate prior CFC filing date | Govt argued an earlier district-court suit (W.D. Mich. No. 15-609) was pending and based on same operative facts when Hood filed in CFC | Held: § 1500 bars jurisdiction because an earlier-filed related suit was pending and the actions arise from substantially the same operative facts |
| Whether the Court should treat the S.D.N.Y. filing/transfer date or the CFC filing date for § 1500 purposes | Hood relied on earlier CFC filing date (Oct. 9, 2015) to avoid § 1500 bar | Govt relied on W.D. Mich. filing and the date of the later-filed S.D.N.Y. complaint/transfer; statute looks at state of pending suits when CFC complaint is filed | Court applied controlling precedent: determine pendency at time complaint is filed in the CFC; Hood had an earlier pending district-court suit, so § 1500 applies |
| Court response to plaintiff's repeated, duplicative filings and forum-shopping | Hood pursued multiple forums seeking favorable outcome on same facts | Govt asserted duplicative filings and pending related suits should preclude CFC jurisdiction and noted prior adverse rulings and sanctions history | Court dismissed complaint and directed clerk not to file future complaints raising the same facts; court criticized duplicative litigation and referenced prior sanctions history |
Key Cases Cited
- Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (pro se pleadings accorded liberal construction)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading must plead factual matter plausibly supporting legal claims)
- United States v. Tohono O'Odham Nation, 563 U.S. 307 (2011) (§ 1500 bars CFC jurisdiction for suits based on substantially the same operative facts as a pending suit elsewhere)
- Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200 (1993) (look to state of things when CFC action is filed for § 1500 analysis)
- Brandt v. United States, 710 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (whether earlier-filed suit is pending for § 1500 purposes is determined at CFC filing time)
- Ontario Power Generation, Inc. v. United States, 369 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (explains Tucker Act categories and money-mandating requirement)
- United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392 (1976) (statute must be money-mandating to support Tucker Act jurisdiction)
- United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983) (Tucker Act and money-mandating limitations)
- United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287 (2009) (Tucker Act does not create substantive rights; source must mandate compensation)