Hood v. State
299 Ga. 95
| Ga. | 2016Background
- James Hood was convicted of malice murder, felony murder (based on possession with intent to distribute oxycodone), possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, possession of a knife, aggravated assault, and related counts for the February 1, 2011 stabbing death of Christopher Coon. Hood and his wife Briana gave multiple, inconsistent statements to police.
- Evidence: Coon arrived to buy pills, was stabbed multiple times and died; bloodstained oxycodone pills and cash were hidden in Hood’s bedroom; brass knuckles were found near the victim; Harrelson (driver) testified that Hood sold pills and had people sent to him; Hood made statements admitting he intended to sell pills to Coon that night.
- Procedural posture: Hood was tried (Feb.–Mar. 2013), convicted on most counts, sentenced to life plus additional terms, and appealed to the Georgia Supreme Court. The Court considered four preserved evidentiary issues under Georgia’s new Evidence Code.
- Trial evidentiary rulings at issue: (1) denial of Hood’s request to recall the interviewing officer to prove a prior inconsistent statement by a defense witness (Kaiser); (2) denial of mistrial after a brief answer implying domestic violence; (3) admission of two witnesses’ testimony that Hood had sold prescription pills on prior occasions (OCGA § 24-4-404(b)).
- Outcome summary: Court affirmed. It found no reversible error on the first two issues and the mistrial request; it held the admission of other-acts drug testimony was an abuse of discretion under Rule 404(b)/403 but that error was harmless given overwhelming and cumulative evidence of intent and guilt.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of prior inconsistent statement via extrinsic evidence (recall Sgt. Saulters to prove Kaiser’s prior statement) | State: exclusion proper because the prior statement was collateral and irrelevant to material issues | Hood: the officer should be recalled to prove Kaiser’s prior inconsistent statement about a prior pill theft; failure to admit was error | Court: Even assuming relevance, exclusion was harmless; not reversible error under §24-6-613(b) and collateral-evidence principles |
| Motion for mistrial after officer testified briefly that Briana feared violence from Hood | State: question had factual basis (diary/letter) and was legitimate | Hood: the question and answer improperly placed character/evidence of bad conduct before jury and warranted mistrial | Court: objection sustained, curative instruction offered; brief “yes” answer plus strong case evidence meant denial of mistrial was not an abuse of discretion |
| Admission of other-acts evidence (testimony that Hood sold pills to Werner and Campbell) under OCGA §24-4-404(b) | State: testimony relevant to Hood’s intent to distribute oxycodone; probative and admissible under 404(b) | Hood: the testimony was unfairly prejudicial, cumulative, and should be excluded especially given his offer to stipulate to intent | Court: admission was an abuse of discretion under the 404(b)/403 balancing (probative value greatly diminished by stipulation and cumulative) but error was harmless given overwhelming independent proof of intent and guilt |
| Sufficiency of the evidence to support convictions | State: evidence (statements, pills, money, witness testimony, location of wounds) sufficed for jury to find guilt beyond reasonable doubt | Hood: (implicit) challenges to factual sufficiency and credibility of witnesses | Court: evidence sufficient under Jackson v. Virginia; jury credited the State’s theory |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (standard for sufficiency of the evidence)
- Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (effect of an offered stipulation on Rule 403 balancing)
- Jones v. State, 297 Ga. 156 (Georgia 404(b) analysis and abuse-of-discretion review)
- Wynn v. State, 272 Ga. 861 (exclusion of irrelevant prior inconsistent statements under Georgia law)
- Billue v. United States, 994 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir.: witness failure of memory as foundation for extrinsic impeachment)
- Russell v. United States, 717 F.2d 518 (11th Cir.: extrinsic impeachment inadmissible on collateral matters)
- Beechum v. United States, 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir.: danger that extrinsic-offense evidence leads jury to convict for propensity; Rule 403 concerns)