58 F.4th 1173
10th Cir.2023Background
- In 1998 Taberon Honie murdered the victim; he was arrested after confessing and later convicted of aggravated murder; the crime included sexual abuse of a child victim and gruesome injuries.
- ~Two weeks before trial Honie, on his counsel’s advice, signed a written and on-the-record waiver of Utah’s statutory right to jury sentencing in the penalty phase; the court and prosecutor consented after a colloquy.
- About a week before trial Honie later alleged he asked counsel to withdraw the waiver after receiving jailhouse advice; counsel allegedly refused saying it was “too late.”
- At trial defense conceded guilt; jury convicted; the judge (the chosen sentencer) imposed death; Utah Supreme Court affirmed conviction and sentence on direct appeal.
- In state postconviction proceedings Honie alleged ineffective assistance: (1) counsel inadequately advised him about jury sentencing, and (2) counsel refused to seek withdrawal of the waiver; the Utah Supreme Court rejected both claims (on prejudice for the withdrawal claim) applying Strickland’s outcome-focused prejudice test.
- On federal habeas Honie argued the Utah court should have applied Hill/Flores‑Ortega/Lafler (a process‑based prejudice test) requiring proof he would have chosen jury sentencing but for counsel’s errors; the Tenth Circuit affirmed denial under AEDPA, holding the Supreme Court had not clearly established that Hill’s process test extends to jury‑sentencing waivers.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Utah Supreme Court applied the correct Strickland prejudice test to counsel’s role in Honie’s jury‑sentencing waiver | Honie: Hill/Flores‑Ortega/Lafler require a process‑based test — he need only show he would have chosen jury sentencing but for counsel’s errors | State: Strickland’s ordinary outcome‑focused test applies; no Supreme Court holding extends Hill to jury‑sentencing waivers | Tenth Cir.: No clearly established Supreme Court law required applying Hill’s process test to jury‑sentencing waivers; Utah court’s outcome test was not an unreasonable application of Strickland under AEDPA |
| Whether Honie fairly presented and preserved his Hill‑based argument to state and federal courts | Honie: he raised that counsel’s advice caused forfeiture of his jury right and thus alleged prejudice of the sort Hill recognizes | State: he didn’t cite Hill (or Flores‑Ortega/Lafler) timely and thus failed to fairly present or preserve the argument | Tenth Cir.: Honie fairly presented the federal claim to Utah courts and preserved it in federal proceedings; the arguments were addressed on the merits |
| Whether trial counsel performed deficiently in advising and obtaining the waiver (knowing/voluntary waiver) | Honie: counsel failed to explain aggravators/mitigators and the consequences; waiver therefore uninformed | State: counsel’s advice to waive was a reasonable tactical decision given the evidence; colloquy and written waiver show knowing, voluntary decision | Tenth Cir.: Deferential AEDPA review; Utah Supreme Court’s conclusion that counsel’s performance and the waiver were reasonable stands (no unreasonable application of Strickland) |
| Whether AEDPA permits extending Hill’s process‑based prejudice to this new context | Honie: Hill and progeny create a general rule applying whenever counsel’s error causes the defendant to forfeit a right only the defendant may waive | State: no controlling Supreme Court holding extends Hill beyond pleas/appeals; AEDPA bars such extension by a federal habeas court | Tenth Cir.: Under AEDPA the Supreme Court has not clearly established that Hill applies to jury‑sentencing waivers; White v. Woodall and Marshall v. Rodgers counsel restraint; denial affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (establishes the two‑pronged ineffective‑assistance test: deficient performance and prejudice)
- Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) (applies Strickland to guilty pleas and adopts a process‑based prejudice inquiry — whether, but for counsel’s error, the defendant would have gone to trial)
- Roe v. Flores‑Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000) (applies Hill‑style process prejudice to failure‑to‑file‑appeal claims — whether, but for counsel’s conduct, the defendant would have timely appealed)
- Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012) (applies Strickland to rejected plea offers and requires showing the plea would have been accepted and been more favorable)
- Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (recognizes the centrality of jury factfinding in capital sentencing and the jury’s role in aggravating findings)
- White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415 (2014) (explains limits of AEDPA review and that logical extensions of Supreme Court precedent may still be unsettled for habeas purposes)
- Marshall v. Rodgers, 569 U.S. 58 (2013) (addresses when a general Supreme Court standard can supply clearly established law but reiterates limits on applying holdings to new contexts)