HON. BERNSTEIN v. State
29 A.3d 267
Md.2011Background
- Charles G. Bernstein challenged Maryland's mandatory retirement age for circuit court judges as applied to him, arguing Article IV, §3 violates equal protection; the federal court certified two questions about retirement, appointment, and running for judicial office.
- The Maryland Constitution§3 provides that judges shall hold office until they attain age seventy or until a successor is elected/qualified, whichever occurs first, with re-eligibility until seventy.
- Bernstein argued §3 applies only to sitting judges who reach seventy in office, allowing others over seventy to be appointed or elected, which he claimed violates equal protection.
- The State contends §3 clearly precludes service after seventy for active circuit court judges and bars any appointment or election of someone over seventy; §5 links age disqualification to appointment and election decisions.
- The Court of Appeals of Maryland analyzed §3 in context with related provisions (notably §§2 and 5) and legislative history, concluding the provision prohibits any person over seventy from serving as a circuit court judge and from being appointed or elected to judicial office.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does Article IV, §3 preclude any person over 70 from serving as a circuit court judge? | Bernstein says §3 only restricts sitting judges who reach 70. | State says §3 bans all who have attained 70 from service. | Yes; §3 prohibits active service by anyone 70 or older. |
| What is the scope of the phrase 'each of the said judges' in §3? | Bernstein contends it refers only to presently serving judges. | State argues it refers to the entire category of judges who are or will be part of the judiciary. | The phrase refers to the entire category of circuit judges, not just current incumbents. |
| How does §5 interact with §3 regarding age eligibility for appointment? | Bernstein suggests §5 creates loopholes by allowing certain appointments. | State argues §5 prohibits appointing anyone who will be disqualified by age, aligning with §3's age cap. | Read together, §3's maximum age applies to both sitting and prospective judges; §5 reinforces the age disqualification. |
| Is the State's interpretation of §3 supported by intent and constitutional structure/history? | Bernstein relies on textual/intent ambiguities and Illinois Maddux reasoning. | State cites historical debates showing framers intended a hard age limit to ensure competence. | Yes; textual context, structure, and historical record support the State's interpretation. |
Key Cases Cited
- Brown v. Brown, 287 Md. 273 (1980) (interpret constitutional text with context; context matters)
- Davis v. Slater, 383 Md. 599 (2004) (apply constitutional construction rules to text and context)
- Fish Market Nominee Corp. v. G.A.A., Inc., 337 Md. 1 (1994) (construe statutory language with broader constitutional structure)
- New Central Coal Co. v. George's Creek Coal & Iron Co., 37 Md. 537 (1873) (read statutes together; harmonize to avoid surplusage)
- Reed v. McKeldin, 207 Md. 553 (1955) (textual interpretation grounded in constitutional history)