Homeward Residential, Inc. v. Gregor
165 A.3d 357
| Me. | 2017Background
- Homeward sued to foreclose on Marianne Gregor’s mortgage in 2011; after trial the court entered a judgment but the parties were allowed to relitigate issues in a future action.
- On appeal this Court held Homeward lacked standing to foreclose and vacated the judgment, directing dismissal without prejudice.
- After remand Gregor sought attorney fees under 14 M.R.S. § 6101, arguing Homeward did not prevail and thus should pay her reasonable costs and fees; Homeward opposed on factual grounds but never argued § 6101 didn’t apply because it lacked standing.
- The trial court determined it had authority under § 6101, adopted a process for fee submission, and later awarded Gregor $59,115 in attorney fees (hours × rate), including fees from the appeal, but denied any fee enhancement.
- Homeward appealed (raising primarily that the fee amount was excessive and that appeal fees shouldn’t be included); Gregor cross-appealed only on enhancement if remand occurred.
- The Law Court affirms: Homeward failed to preserve its statutory-coverage argument; the court did not abuse its discretion in including appeal-related fees or in the overall fee award.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Gregor) | Defendant's Argument (Homeward) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial court had authority under 14 M.R.S. § 6101 to award mortgagor fees where plaintiff lacked standing | § 6101 applies because Homeward did not prevail; court may order mortgagee to pay fees | Homeward argued on appeal that it was not “the mortgagee” under § 6101 because it lacked standing (argument not raised below) | Not reached on merits — waived for appeal because Homeward did not preserve the issue in the trial court |
| Whether appeal-related fees are recoverable under § 6101 | Appeal was integral to defending the foreclosure and necessary to avoid collateral estoppel; thus appeal fees are included | Appeal succeeded in part; Homeward contends it prevailed on appeal and those fees are not within § 6101’s scope | Court did not abuse discretion including appeal-related fees; appeal was part of the overall foreclosure defense |
| Whether the amount of the fee award (hours × rate = $59,115) was an abuse of discretion | Requested full hours and rate; opposed enhancement but sought full compensation for reasonable work | Argued award should be reduced, and no enhancement appropriate; asked court to exclude some fees | No abuse of discretion: trial court considered relevant factors and reasonably declined reduction or enhancement |
| Whether a fee enhancement should have been awarded | Gregor sought enhancement (but only pressed on cross-appeal if remand occurred) | Homeward opposed enhancement | Court denied enhancement; Law Court affirms and does not reach cross-appeal issue further because no remand was required |
Key Cases Cited
- Homeward Residential, Inc. v. Gregor, 122 A.3d 947 (Me. 2015) (prior appeal holding plaintiff lacked standing and vacating judgment)
- Brown v. Town of Starks, 114 A.3d 1003 (Me. 2015) (preservation requirement for appellate review)
- Foster v. Oral Surgery Assocs., P.A., 940 A.2d 1102 (Me. 2008) (issues raised first on appeal not preserved)
- Runnells v. Quinn, 890 A.2d 713 (Me. 2006) (review of factual finding whether party prevailed is for clear error in fee disputes)
- Landis v. Hannaford Bros., 754 A.2d 958 (Me. 2000) (look at the lawsuit as a whole when assessing prevailing party for costs/fees)
- Gould v. A-1 Auto, Inc., 945 A.2d 1225 (Me. 2008) (factors for determining reasonable attorney fees)
- Kezer v. Central Me. Med. Ctr., 40 A.3d 955 (Me. 2012) (abuse of discretion standard for attorney-fee awards)
- Pettinelli v. Yost, 930 A.2d 1074 (Me. 2007) (trial court’s fee determinations reviewed for reasonableness)
- True v. Harmon, 110 A.3d 650 (Me. 2015) (on remand courts may consider appellate fees where statutory language covers proceedings)