165 A.3d 357
Me.2017Background
- Homeward filed a residential foreclosure against Marianne Gregor in 2011; after trial the court entered judgment but made findings adverse to Gregor and reserved rights to relitigate; Gregor appealed.
- This Court held Homeward lacked standing to foreclose, vacated the judgment, and remanded for dismissal without prejudice.
- On remand Gregor moved under 14 M.R.S. § 6101 for an award of her reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred defending the foreclosure.
- The trial court concluded it had authority under § 6101 to order Homeward to pay Gregor’s fees, adopted a procedure for establishing the amount, and later awarded $59,115 (hours × rate), including fees for work on the appeal; the court declined to apply an enhancement.
- Homeward appealed, arguing (1) it was not "the mortgagee" under § 6101 because it lacked standing, so the statute could not apply, and (2) the court abused its discretion in the amount awarded and in including appeal-related fees.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed: Homeward forfeited the statutory-application argument by not raising it below; the inclusion of appeal fees and the overall fee amount were within the trial court’s discretion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Gregor) | Defendant's Argument (Homeward) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 6101 authorizes fee-shifting against Homeward after dismissal | § 6101 permits awarding mortgagor fees where the mortgagee does not prevail; court may order Homeward to pay | Homeward: because it lacked standing, it is not "the mortgagee" under § 6101 so statute cannot apply | Not reached on merits — Homeward waived this issue by failing to raise it in the trial court; appellate review denied on preservation grounds |
| Whether appeal-related fees may be included in a § 6101 award | Appeal was integral to defense of the foreclosure and necessary to avoid collateral estoppel; such fees were "incurred in defending against the foreclosure or any proceeding within the foreclosure action" | Homeward: it prevailed on appeal and thus appeal-related fees are not recoverable under § 6101 | Trial court did not abuse discretion: looking at the litigation as a whole, inclusion of appeal fees was reasonable |
| Whether the amount awarded (hours × rate = $59,115) was an abuse of discretion | The lodestar calculation was supported by affidavit and time records; no enhancement warranted | Homeward: award was excessive and should be reduced; appeal fees should be excluded; enhancement inappropriate | No abuse of discretion: trial court considered established factors, declined reduction or enhancement, and its award was within reasonable bounds |
| Whether a fee enhancement should have been awarded | (Gregor cross-appealed seeking review of denial of enhancement only if remanded) | Homeward opposed any enhancement | Not decided: Court affirmed judgment so did not reach Gregor’s cross-appeal contention about enhancement |
Key Cases Cited
- Homeward Residential, Inc. v. Gregor, 122 A.3d 947 (Me. 2015) (prior opinion holding Homeward lacked standing to foreclose)
- Gould v. A-1 Auto, Inc., 945 A.2d 1225 (Me. 2008) (factors to consider in determining reasonable attorney fees)
- Landis v. Hannaford Bros., 754 A.2d 958 (Me. 2000) (court should consider the lawsuit as a whole when deciding prevailing-party issues)
- True v. Harmon, 110 A.3d 650 (Me. 2015) (on remand a court may consider appellate fees when statute authorizes fees for participation in proceedings)
- Brown v. Town of Starks, 114 A.3d 1003 (Me. 2015) (preservation rule: issues must be presented to trial court to be preserved)
- Runnells v. Quinn, 890 A.2d 713 (Me. 2006) ("prevailing" is a factual determination reviewed for clear error)
- Pettinelli v. Yost, 930 A.2d 1074 (Me. 2007) (appellate standard that fee determinations must fall within bounds of reasonableness)
- Penkul v. Matarazzo, 983 A.2d 375 (Me. 2009) (risk of collateral estoppel can justify an appeal even from a judgment nominally in the appellant’s favor)