Homer Hillis v. Henry McCall, 602 S.W.3d 436

Background

Hillis owned a bed-and-breakfast (B&B) and leased a neighboring cabin to McCall; McCall had access to the B&B to use appliances and sometimes to open it for guests.
On Dec. 12, 2014, while checking under the B&B kitchen sink for a leak at Hillis’s request, McCall was bitten by a brown recluse spider.
Brown recluse spiders are indigenous to Texas; neither Hillis nor McCall had actual knowledge that brown recluses lived on the property before the bite, though both had intermittently observed spiders inside the buildings and McCall had notified Hillis of spider sightings.
Hillis used pest control on an "as-needed" basis (housekeeper set off bug bombs when pests were noticed); there were no guest complaints about insects in reviews.
McCall sued Hillis for negligence/premises liability alleging Hillis knew or should have known of an unreasonable risk and failed to warn or make safe; the trial court granted summary judgment for Hillis relying on the ferae naturae doctrine, the court of appeals reversed, and the Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and rendered judgment for Hillis.

Issues

Issue	McCall's Argument	Hillis's Argument	Held
Does the ferae naturae doctrine bar a landowner duty for injuries caused by indigenous wild animals found inside an artificial structure?	Ferae naturae should not bar duty here because a dangerous spider was inside the B&B (an artificial structure) and owner knew or should have known of risk.	Ferae naturae bars a duty unless owner introduced, harbored, or reduced animal to possession; no such acts here.	Owner may owe a duty for dangerous wild animals inside artificial structures, but only if the owner knows or should know of an unreasonable risk; under the facts Hillis negated duty as a matter of law.
Did Hillis’s general knowledge that spiders had been seen in the B&B plus awareness that brown recluses exist in Texas establish he knew or should have known of an unreasonable risk?	Yes — prior spider sightings plus knowledge that brown recluses are in Texas meant Hillis should have foreseen the risk and warned.	No — intermittent, general knowledge of spiders and general knowledge that brown recluses exist in Texas do not establish knowledge of an unreasonable risk of venomous spiders in this building.	Held that general awareness of spiders and that brown recluses live in Texas did not amount to knowledge or reason to know of an unreasonable risk posed by brown recluses in Hillis’s B&B.
Does McCall’s own knowledge that spiders had been seen in the B&B affect Hillis’s duty to warn?	McCall argued Hillis should have warned despite McCall’s awareness.	Hillis argued McCall’s awareness of spiders meant no duty to warn about the general risk.	Court held owner need not warn of a risk the invitee already knows; mutual actual knowledge negated a duty here.

Key Cases Cited

Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Nami, 498 S.W.3d 890 (Tex. 2016) (describing ferae naturae limits on landowner duty and exception for wild animals inside artificial structures when owner knows or should know of unreasonable risk)
Overstreet v. Gibson Prod. Co., 558 S.W.2d 58 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (recognizing owner owes no duty until knowing or having reason to know dangerous acts by wild animals are occurring)
Nicholson v. Smith, 986 S.W.2d 54 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, no pet.) (refusing to impose duty to warn guests about indigenous wild animals in ordinary circumstances)
Del Lago Partners, Inc. v. Smith, 307 S.W.3d 762 (Tex. 2010) (explaining exceptions to general no-duty rules where risks are foreseeable and unreasonable)
Austin v. Kroger Tex., L.P., 465 S.W.3d 193 (Tex. 2015) (premises-liability duty to invitees to warn or make safe concealed, unreasonably dangerous conditions owner knows or should know of)
Walker v. Harris, 924 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. 1996) (existence of duty is a question of law for the court)
United Scaffolding, Inc. v. Levine, 537 S.W.3d 463 (Tex. 2017) (landowner’s duty to invitees measured by ordinary care to reduce unreasonable risks known or should be known)
Occidental Chem. Corp. v. Jenkins, 478 S.W.3d 640 (Tex. 2016) (premises-liability claims arise from conditions of real property)