Home Star Bank and Financial Services, etc. v. Emergency Care and Health Organization, Ltd.
2014 IL 115526
| Ill. | 2014Background
- On Aug. 25, 2001 Edward Anderson suffered respiratory distress at Provena St. Mary’s; ER physician Dr. Michael Murphy (an ECHO contractor paid hourly) responded to a Code Blue in the ICU and attempted intubation; Anderson suffered severe brain injury.
- Plaintiffs sued Murphy and ECHO for negligence; defendants moved for summary judgment invoking Good Samaritan Act immunity (745 ILCS 49/25) because no physician bill was sent for the Code Blue.
- Relevant agreements and hospital policies showed ECHO was the exclusive ER provider, ECHO physicians were paid/compensated (hourly or per diem) and ER physicians were expected to respond to Code Blues as part of their duties.
- Earlier Illinois appellate decisions had applied section 25 when the patient was not billed (focusing on whether a bill was sent), while Henslee (N.D. Ill.) concluded “fee” is ambiguous and immunity was intended only for volunteers (i.e., those not compensated).
- Trial court granted summary judgment for defendants; the Illinois Appellate Court reversed, holding section 25 meant to promote volunteerism and did not cover paid physicians responding as part of their job. The Illinois Supreme Court granted leave and affirmed the appellate court.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether “without fee” in 745 ILCS 49/25 bars immunity when a physician is compensated by an employer but the patient was not billed | "Without fee" refers to absence of a patient bill; because no physician bill was sent, Murphy acted "without fee" and is immune | "Without fee" is unambiguous: immunity applies whenever the patient was not billed for the physician’s services | The term "fee" is ambiguous; when read with legislative purpose the Act protects volunteers, not physicians who are paid to respond as part of their job — Murphy was not "without fee" and cannot claim immunity |
| Whether a preexisting duty to respond (employment/contractual) is fatal to invoking the Act | Preexisting duty makes immunity inapplicable because the physician was not volunteering | Prior precedent held preexisting duty not necessarily fatal; focus should be on billing/payment | Preexisting duty is relevant: here the record shows Murphy responded as part of his employment, supporting the conclusion he was not a volunteer |
| Whether courts should look beyond whether a patient was billed to determine "fee" (e.g., whether physician was paid) | Courts should examine compensation structures and legislative purpose; modern billing practices require looking at payment to the physician | Prior Illinois cases limited inquiry to whether the patient received a bill | Court adopts broader approach: consider physician compensation and legislative history; modern payment systems counsel including physician compensation in determining "fee" |
| Whether Good Samaritan immunity would create inequitable results if limited to the presence/absence of a patient bill | The narrow rule could produce class disparities (insured vs. indigent) and allow gaming of billing to obtain immunity | The narrow rule follows precedent and bright-line inquiry (bill sent or not) | Court agrees narrow rule risks unjust results and thwarts statute’s volunteerism purpose; adopts broader interpretation to avoid such consequences |
Key Cases Cited
- Heanue v. Edgcomb, 355 Ill. App. 3d 645 (Ill. App. 2005) (held immunity may depend on whether decision not to bill was made in good faith)
- Neal v. Yang, 352 Ill. App. 3d 820 (Ill. App. 2004) (applied Act when plaintiff was not billed despite preexisting duty)
- Johnson v. Matviuw, 176 Ill. App. 3d 907 (Ill. App. 1988) (applied Act where no bill was sent for physician who responded to Code Blue)
- Henslee v. Provena Hospitals, 373 F. Supp. 2d 802 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (concluded "fee" ambiguous; Good Samaritan Act aimed to protect volunteers, so paid physicians are not immune)
- Rodas v. Seidlin, 656 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 2011) (reversed summary judgments; found fact issues about billing/good faith and endorsed careful inquiry into compensation/ billing practices)