Homa v. GC Services Limited Partnership, 2:17-cv-01661

On Nov. 5, 2015 GC Services sent a debt-collection letter to Denise Homa (the “Homa Letter”) seeking payment on a Chase credit-card debt; a separate but similar letter was sent to Catherine Vaughan on Feb. 4, 2016.
Homa and Vaughan brought separate FDCPA suits challenging the collection letters; both were defended together and GC Services moved to dismiss both complaints.
The Court initially granted GC Services’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion on Sept. 27, 2018, dismissing all claims in both actions based in part on an indication the two letters were identical.
Homa moved for reconsideration, pointing out a material difference: the Homa Letter said disputes must be made “within thirty (30) days after your receipt of GC Services’ Initial Written Notice to you concerning this debt,” but did not identify the letter itself as the “Initial Written Notice.”
The Court found it had relied on incorrect factual data (the letters are not identical), granted reconsideration, and reevaluated Homa’s first cause of action under 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3) and § 1692e.
The Court denied GC Services’ motion to dismiss as to Homa’s first cause of action, concluding the Homa Letter’s phrasing could mislead the least sophisticated consumer about the applicable 30‑day dispute period.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the Homa Letter violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3) (and § 1692e) by failing to identify itself as the required “initial written notice,” thereby confusing the dispute period	Homa: The letter’s phrase “receipt of GC Services’ Initial Written Notice to you concerning this debt” but failing to label the letter itself as that “initial written notice” could confuse the least sophisticated consumer about when the 30‑day dispute period begins	GC Services: The letter language is adequate and mirrors acceptable statutory language used in other decisions; dismissal was proper	Court: Reconsideration granted; because the Homa Letter did not identify itself as the initial written notice, its language could mislead the least sophisticated consumer, so dismissal of the § 1692g(a) claim was denied

Shrader v. CSX Transp., 70 F.3d 255 (2d Cir. 1995) (motion for reconsideration requires overlooked facts or controlling decisions)
Virgin Atlantic Airways, Ltd. v. National Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245 (2d Cir. 1992) (grounds for reconsideration include intervening law, new evidence, or clear error)
National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Stroh Cos., 265 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2001) (party cannot advance new facts or arguments on reconsideration)
DiMatteo v. Sweeney, Gallo, Reich & Bolz, L.L.P., [citation="619 F. App'x 7"] (2d Cir. 2015) (FDCPA communications judged by least‑sophisticated‑consumer standard; deceptive if open to multiple reasonable interpretations)
Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314 (2d Cir. 1993) (articulating the least‑sophisticated‑consumer standard)
Kagan v. Selene Finance L.P., 210 F. Supp. 3d 535 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (notice that states deadline as "within 30 days of receipt of this notice" tracks statutory language)