Holt-Orsted v. City of Dickson
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 10379
| 6th Cir. | 2011Background
- Plaintiffs allege environmental discrimination and injury from a TCE-contaminated landfill operated by the City and County of Dickson, with African-American Holt plaintiffs claiming delayed warnings compared to Caucasian neighbors.
- Plaintiffs filed suit in Tennessee state court; the case was later removed to the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee.
- The dispute at issue is a magistrate judge's order compelling testimony of Sharon Jacobs, plaintiffs’ former counsel, over attorney-client privilege during a deposition conducted under Rule 31.
- Jacobs previously consulted with decedent Harry Holt and sought data under the Tennessee Public Records Act and FOIA regarding soil and water testing around the landfill.
- Defendants argued that the questioned deposition topics sought privileged information and that the statute of limitations defense may bar the claims if Jacobs discussed contamination in 2000.
- The district court referred the discovery dispute to a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); the magistrate granted partial relief and plaintiffs appealed directly.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the appeal is jurisdictionally proper | Holt consented to plenary § 636(c) review. | Consent was limited or improper under § 636(c). | No merit to challenge; jurisdiction exists to review under § 636(c). |
| Whether the district court’s discovery order is immediately reviewable under collateral review | Perlman/Mohawk allow immediate appeal of privilege-disclosure orders. | Mohawk narrows collateral-review avenues; Perlman not available when privilege holder is a party. | Mohawk limits collateral review; no immediate appeal under collateral-order/Perlman. |
| Whether Mohawk’s framework applies given the Holt plaintiffs are parties to the litigation | Privilege holder has no post-judgment remedy; need immediate review. | Mohawk allows post-judgment review for parties; no basis for interlocutory reversal. | Mohawk precludes interlocutory appeal; no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. |
Key Cases Cited
- Moses v. Sterling Commerce (America), Inc., 122 F. App'x 177 (6th Cir.2005) (full § 636(c) jurisdiction for plenary magistrate jurisdiction)
- Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580 (U.S. 2003) (consent to magistrate jurisdiction; Roell standard for implied consent)
- Ambrose v. Welch, 729 F.2d 1084 (6th Cir.1984) (clear and unambiguous consent required for plenary jurisdiction)
- Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599 (U.S. 2009) (collateral order doctrine does not extend to privilege-disclosure orders)
- Ross v. City of Memphis, 423 F.3d 596 (6th Cir.2005) (permitted immediate review when discovery would foreclose privilege against a party)