Holmes v. Holmes
467 Mass. 653
| Mass. | 2014Background
- Kenneth and Elaine Holmes married in 1991; Elaine filed for divorce in May 2006. Temporary alimony and child support were ordered in 2006 by agreement; temporary alimony ran ~2 years, 3 months, 25 days.
- Divorce judgment (Oct. 9, 2008) set weekly payments of $1,300 (classified $700 alimony, $600 child support) to continue until death or remarriage.
- Wife sought modification in 2011; after the Alimony Reform Act of 2011 took effect the judge reclassified the full $1,300 as alimony and set a durational end date based on the Act’s presumptive limits for a ~15-year marriage (maximum presumptive duration: 12 years), but did not credit the temporary-alimony period against that 12-year term.
- Husband moved for relief arguing the 12‑year presumptive period should run from the start of temporary alimony (service of complaint in June 2006) rather than from the divorce judgment; motion denied and husband appealed.
- Trial judge declined to reduce duration despite health and income facts, and the appeal concerns whether temporary alimony paid during litigation counts toward the presumptive maximum duration for general term alimony under G. L. c. 208, § 49(b).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Holmes — husband) | Defendant's Argument (Holmes — wife) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether temporary alimony paid during pendency of divorce counts toward the presumptive maximum duration of "general term alimony" under G. L. c. 208, § 49(b). | Temporary alimony is "alimony" paid under court order and should count from time of service of complaint; thus the presumptive term should begin when temporary alimony began. | The reform act’s presumptive limits apply to "general term alimony," which is a postjudgment category; temporary alimony (§ 17) is distinct and predates termination of the marriage, so it should not be included. | Court held temporary alimony is separate from general term alimony; the presumptive duration under § 49(b) begins at the divorce judgment, not the temporary alimony start date. |
| Whether the judge abused discretion by not crediting temporary-alimony time when setting the durational end date. | The judge should have credited the time or otherwise reduced the duration; failure was abuse of discretion. | Judge had discretion to set duration using statutory factors; no evidence wife unfairly delayed; use of maximum presumptive duration was reasonable. | No abuse of discretion; judge's decision affirmed. |
| Whether the statute’s definition of "alimony" in § 48 requires including temporary alimony in § 49(b) calculations. | § 48 defines "alimony" broadly and thus temporary alimony falls within it. | § 49(b) specifically governs "general term alimony;" legislative choice to limit that term excludes other forms like temporary alimony. | Court relied on statutory text: § 49(b) addresses "general term alimony" only, so temporary awards are excluded from the presumptive calculation. |
| Whether policy concerns about incentivizing delay defeat the textual reading. | Including temporary alimony avoids incentivizing delay in finalizing divorce to extend payments. | Judges may consider delay or unusually long temporary alimony under § 53(a) factors and reduce duration below the presumptive maximum; statutory text controls. | Policy concerns do not override the text; court allowed that judges may consider temporary-alimony duration or dilatory conduct when exercising discretion. |
Key Cases Cited
- Baird v. Baird, 311 Mass. 329 (expressing that § 17 assumes marriage not legally terminated)
- Wallace v. Wallace, 273 Mass. 62 (same principle regarding pendency awards)
- Cohan v. Feuer, 442 Mass. 151 (alimony terminates at remarriage or death absent agreement)
- Moore v. Moore, 389 Mass. 21 (public policy favors settlement of property disputes by agreement)
- Pierce v. Pierce, 455 Mass. 286 (appellate deference to trial judge’s discretion in modification judgments)
- Commonwealth v. Nanny, 462 Mass. 798 (primary reliance on statutory text to determine legislative intent)
- International Fid. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 387 Mass. 841 (statutory language as primary guide to legislative intent)