Holly Vanzant v. Hill's Pet Nutrition, Incorpo
934 F.3d 730
| 7th Cir. | 2019Background
- Plaintiffs Holly Vanzant and Dana Land purchased Hill’s "Prescription Diet" cat food at PetSmart pursuant to veterinarians’ prescriptions and paid premium prices, believing the products were medically distinct and FDA‑approved.
- The products were marketed and labeled as "prescription" diet foods; PetSmart issued prescription cards and required presentation at purchase.
- Plaintiffs later learned the FDA had not approved most such pet‑food products as new animal drugs and that no prescription was legally required; they allege the prescription labeling and sales practice were deceptive and caused overpayment.
- Plaintiffs filed a putative class action in state court asserting violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (ICFA) and unjust enrichment; defendants removed and the district court dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).
- The district court dismissed the ICFA claim as barred by the Act’s safe‑harbor for conduct "specifically authorized by laws administered by" a regulatory body, relying on an FDA Compliance Policy Guide, and found Rule 9(b) pleadings inadequate; it dismissed unjust enrichment as duplicative.
- The Seventh Circuit reversed: it held the FDA guidance does not specifically authorize the challenged conduct and therefore the safe‑harbor does not apply; it also found the complaint met Rule 9(b)’s particularity standard, and allowed the unjust‑enrichment (restitution) claim to proceed as tied to the statutory fraud claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether ICFA safe‑harbor shields defendants because FDA guidance authorizes prescription labeling/sales | FDA guidance does not authorize the prescription requirement; guidance merely reflects enforcement discretion | FDA Compliance Policy Guide specifically authorizes or permits the prescription‑only marketing/sales practice | Safe‑harbor does not apply: the FDA guidance reflects enforcement forbearance, not specific authorization |
| Whether the complaint pleads deceptive‑practice ICFA claim with Rule 9(b) particularity | Complaint identifies who, what, when, where, how (saw prescription labeling, paid premium) | Plaintiffs failed to plead reliance and other fraud particulars | Complaint satisfies Rule 9(b): sufficiently pleaded the who/what/when/where/how; reliance is not an ICFA element |
| Whether an unfair‑practice theory requires heightened pleading | Plaintiffs may alternatively plead unfair practice without fraud particularity | Defendants argue all claims require Rule 9(b) specificity | Unnecessary to decide because deceptive‑practice claim survives; unfair theory not subjected to Rule 9(b) in any event |
| Whether unjust enrichment may proceed | Unjust enrichment seeks restitution tied to alleged fraud and thus may proceed if statutory claim survives | Unjust enrichment is duplicative and should be dismissed with statutory claim | Unjust‑enrichment (restitution) is not a freestanding claim under Illinois law but survives to the extent it seeks restitution based on the viable ICFA claim |
Key Cases Cited
- Camasta v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 761 F.3d 732 (7th Cir.) (Rule 12(b)(6) and pleading specificity standard)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court) (pleading must permit plausible inference of liability)
- Robinson v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., 775 N.E.2d 951 (Ill.) (scope and purpose of Illinois Consumer Fraud Act)
- Price v. Philip Morris, Inc., 848 N.E.2d 1 (Ill.) (when regulatory actions can trigger ICFA safe‑harbor)
- Toulon v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 877 F.3d 725 (7th Cir.) (unjust enrichment not a separate cause of action under Illinois law)