Holly Gail Crampton v. Commission for Lawyer Discipline
545 S.W.3d 593
| Tex. App. | 2016Background
- Holly Gail Crampton was retained by Steven and Tammy Young to pursue state-court civil-rights claims and intervene in an adoption; they paid a $7,500 non-refundable retainer. The written fee agreement said it covered state-court matters only.
- The Youngs believed (based on discussions with Crampton) the matter might end up in federal court; Crampton did not disclose she was barred from practicing in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas due to an unpaid federal sanction.
- The Youngs’ suit, asserting only federal claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982 and 1983, was filed in Wichita County state court, removed to federal court, and dismissed without prejudice after no responses were filed to dispositive motions; no reinstatement or appeal was pursued.
- The Youngs filed a grievance with the State Bar; the Commission filed a disciplinary petition in district court and moved for partial summary judgment on six alleged ethics violations; Judge William Mazur granted summary judgment on three violations (competence/diligence and declining/terminating representation).
- A partially probated two-year suspension (one year probated) and restitution were ordered; after Mazur ceased to be an active judge, the Texas Supreme Court rescinded his appointment and replaced him; the replacement judge overruled Crampton’s motion for new trial.
- On appeal Crampton argued (1) the rescission voided Mazur’s earlier orders, (2) the partial summary judgment was improper, and (3) summary judgment and Texas’s preponderance-of-the-evidence standard are constitutionally insufficient in disciplinary proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Crampton) | Defendant's Argument (Commission) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does the Supreme Court’s rescission of Judge Mazur’s appointment void his prior orders? | “Rescinds” invalidates prior actions; Mazur’s summary judgment is void. | Rescission replaced an inactive judge; prior acts while he was active remain valid. | Rescission did not void prior valid acts; Mazur’s orders stand. |
| Was partial summary judgment proper on Rules 1.01(b)(1), 1.01(b)(2), and 1.15(a)(1)? | Disputed facts (client agreement to do nothing if removed) and other defenses preclude summary judgment. | Undisputed record shows Crampton failed to notify clients of her federal disbarment and failed to withdraw; these facts satisfy the rules. | Affirmed: summary judgment appropriate as to Rule 1.15 and related duties; withdrawal and disclosure obligations were violated. |
| Does application of Texas summary judgment procedure in disciplinary proceedings violate due process or require a higher burden of proof? | Disciplinary suspension is quasi-criminal; summary judgment and preponderance standard are insufficient. | Disciplinary proceedings are civil; summary judgment and preponderance standard are authorized by rules and due process. | Rejected: disciplinary matters are civil; summary judgment and preponderance standard do not violate due process. |
| Must a lawyer disclose inability to appear in a tribunal and withdraw if continued representation would violate other law? | Prior client agreement to do nothing should excuse non-action; advice about forum did not require disclosure of federal bar status. | Clients must be able to make informed decisions; inability to practice in forum is material and requires disclosure or withdrawal. | Held: nondisclosure of federal disbarment and failure to withdraw were violations; disclosure and withdrawal duties are objective and enforceable. |
Key Cases Cited
- In re State Bar of Texas, 113 S.W.3d 730 (Tex. 2003) (Supreme Court’s role regulating legal profession and disciplinary procedure)
- In re Union Pacific Resources Co., 969 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. 1998) (actions by recused judge remain valid unless altered by successor)
- Buckholts Independent Sch. Dist. v. Glaser, 632 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. 1982) (orders by constitutionally disqualified judge are void)
- Fry v. Tucker, 202 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. 1947) (voidness of orders by disqualified judges)
- King v. Oakley, 434 P.2d 868 (Okla. 1967) (context controls meaning of "rescind")
- Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (U.S. 1992) (limits domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction)
- Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860 (Tex. 2010) (standard of review for summary judgment)
- Edwards v. General Motors Corp., 153 F.3d 242 (5th Cir.) (attorney sanctions and federal-court practice consequences)