Holloway v. State, 293 Neb. 12

Background

Nikko Jenkins was incarcerated by the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services, exhibited violent behavior and signs of serious mental illness, and repeatedly requested treatment; he was released after serving about 10.5 years.
About a month after release, Jenkins shot Shamecka Holloway, causing permanent injuries; Holloway sued the State, several state employees, and Correct Care Solutions (CCS), the contractor providing medical services at the Tecumseh facility.
Holloway alleged the State and individual defendants negligently failed to seek civil commitment and improperly applied "good time" credits, and that CCS/Dr. Baker negligently evaluated and treated Jenkins; she later voluntarily dismissed Baker.
Defendants moved to dismiss; the district court granted dismissal with prejudice, finding (1) the State and its employees were immune under the State Tort Claims Act’s discretionary function exception as to the decision to seek commitment, and (2) Holloway failed to state a negligence claim against CCS (no viable respondeat superior or duty to a "reasonably identifiable" victim).
Holloway appealed; the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed, holding the commitment-reporting decision is discretionary and that CCS was not plausibly liable given the pleaded facts.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the State’s decision to seek civil commitment is discretionary	Holloway: statutes make commitment mandatory ("shall") and State had duty to commit/notify	State: MHCA provisions use permissive language ("may") and commitment/reporting involves policy judgments	Held: Decision to report/seek commitment is discretionary and falls within the Act’s discretionary function exception; sovereign immunity applies
Whether the discretionary function exception shields operational acts vs. policy decisions	Holloway: failure to warn/public notice is non-discretionary where harm is known to State	State: reporting is planning-level policy (encourages voluntary treatment), not a ministerial duty	Held: Exception protects the policy decision not to report/commit; Lemke distinguished because State lacked control over Jenkins
Whether CCS can be vicariously liable for Dr. Baker after Baker’s dismissal	Holloway: CCS is liable for negligent evaluation/treatment giving rise to Jenkins’s release	CCS: Baker was dismissed by plaintiff; no pleaded negligent employee to impute; CCS did not control release	Held: Because Baker was voluntarily dismissed and plaintiff pleaded no other negligent employee, respondeat superior fails; claim against CCS insufficient
Whether CCS owed Holloway a duty to third persons or to warn a "reasonably identifiable" victim	Holloway: State/CCS knew Jenkins was dangerous and should have warned public (Holloway specifically)	Defense: Mental Health statutes limit provider liability to situations where practitioner received a serious, specific threat to a reasonably identifiable victim; no special custodial relationship existed	Held: Holloway did not allege Jenkins communicated a specific threat to her or that she was a reasonably identifiable victim; CCS owed no special duty and cannot be liable

Key Cases Cited

Litherland v. Jurgens, 291 Neb. 775 (Neb. 2015) (standard of review for dismissal and immunity issues)
Jasa v. Douglas County, 244 Neb. 944 (Neb. 1994) (distinguishing liability where government lacks control of injury-causing agent)
Shipley v. Department of Roads, 283 Neb. 832 (Neb. 2012) (two-step discretionary-function analysis)
Lemke v. Metropolitan Utilities Dist., 243 Neb. 633 (Neb. 1993) (government has nondiscretionary duty to warn when it controls a dangerous condition)
Munstermann v. Alegent Health, 271 Neb. 834 (Neb. 2006) (limits on mental-health professional liability for failure to warn)
Bartunek v. State, 266 Neb. 454 (Neb. 2003) (custodial/special-relationship requirement for duty to control third parties)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2009) (plausibility pleading standard)