Holloway v. Quetel, 242 Cal. App. 4th 1425

Background

Plaintiff Purvis Holloway, an incarcerated pro se litigant, sued Talia Quetel and Antonio McDaniels (May 6, 2009) for unpaid rent and property damage relating to a Compton residence, seeking $36,814 plus ongoing monthly sums.
Defaults were entered against defendants in August 2009, but Plaintiff’s attempts to obtain a default judgment were repeatedly rejected for procedural defects; the complaint was later struck and defaults set aside, and the case was dismissed then reversed on prior appeal (Holloway I) to reinstate the original complaint and defaults.
After remand, Holloway repeatedly filed form CIV-100 and other papers but never submitted declarations under penalty of perjury setting forth facts and damage calculations based on personal knowledge, nor a proposed form of judgment; some filings were unsigned or in improper form.
The trial court ultimately found Holloway failed to carry his burden of proof, entered judgment for defendants (alternatively dismissed for failure to prosecute), and Holloway appealed.
The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded, holding Holloway should be given a reasonable opportunity to file a new CIV-100 with supporting declarations executed under penalty of perjury and a proposed form of judgment; the appellate court criticized the trial court for not giving clear, neutral guidance to the incarcerated pro se litigant.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Holloway complied with statutory and rule requirements for entry of default judgment (CCP §585, §2015.5; Cal. Rules Ct. 3.1800)	Holloway argued he had submitted all required papers (form CIV-100 and supporting materials) to obtain a default judgment.	Defendants made no appearance; trial court treated filings as inadequate.	Held: Holloway did not submit required sworn declarations detailing occupancy, agreement to pay rent, damage descriptions/calculations, or a proposed judgment, so trial court correctly refused to enter default judgment on that basis.
Whether the trial court erred in entering judgment/dismissing the action rather than allowing further compliant filings after multiple defective submissions	Holloway contended the court should have accepted his papers or more clearly instructed him and allowed entry of judgment.	No opposing brief; court maintained plaintiff’s burden to prove damages.	Held: Reversed and remanded — appellate court found trial court abused discretion by not providing clear, neutral guidance to the incarcerated pro se plaintiff and should permit him a reasonable opportunity to file compliant CIV-100, sworn declarations, and proposed judgment.
Whether the trial court’s communications misstated applicable form requirements (e.g., JUD-100) and local rules	Holloway argued court misled him by requiring optional JUD-100 and by giving inconsistent reasons for rejecting papers.	Trial court relied on its interpretation of rules and local practices in rejecting filings.	Held: Appellate court found the trial court mischaracterized local rule and optional form requirements, which contributed to confusion; remand for opportunity to cure.

Key Cases Cited

Ford v. Superior Court, 34 Cal.App.3d 338 (1973) (clerk may enter judgment only where damages are a fixed amount ascertainable by computation)
Kim v. Westmoore Partners, Inc., 201 Cal.App.4th 267 (2011) (plaintiffs in default proceedings must prove entitlement to claimed damages)
Maxwell v. Superior Court, 1 Cal.2d 294 (1934) (appeal from nonappealable order does not divest trial court of jurisdiction)
Hopkins & Carley v. Gens, 200 Cal.App.4th 1401 (2011) (same principle regarding jurisdiction during nonappealable orders)
Pazderka v. Caballeros Dimas Alang, Inc., 62 Cal.App.4th 658 (1998) (procedural guidance on court orders and reviewability)
Austin v. Valverde, 211 Cal.App.4th 546 (2012) (failure to exercise discretion is an abuse of discretion; courts may make reasonable accommodations for pro se litigants)