668 B.R. 358
Bankr. W.D. Pa.2025Background
- The plaintiff, Tammy Allison Holloway (and her law firm), and defendant, Charles L. Harris, had a brief consensual romantic relationship, which ended in August 2022.
- After the breakup, Harris, knowing Holloway did not want contact, left a single, profane voicemail on her phone, demanding repayment of money allegedly spent during the relationship and threatening legal and bar action.
- Holloway filed a claim in Harris’s bankruptcy case, arguing the voicemail constituted the tort of intrusion upon seclusion, seeking to have any resulting debt declared nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).
- At trial, Holloway did not testify or present evidence of emotional distress or other injury; only Harris testified.
- The court excluded other alleged recordings for failing to comply with pretrial disclosure rules. The record contained no evidence of repeated conduct or actionable threats.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a single profane voicemail is a "willful and malicious injury" under § 523(a)(6) and nondischargeable | Harris's voicemail was a substantial privacy intrusion and highly offensive, thus nondischargeable | The voicemail, while vulgar, was not substantial, persistent, or damaging enough | A single offensive voicemail, without more, is not “substantial” or “highly offensive;” not nondischargeable |
| Whether the tort of "intrusion upon seclusion" is established | Voicemail alone met the elements under Pennsylvania law | No substantial intrusion or actual harm was proven | Intrusion requires substantial, highly offensive conduct and proof of harm; not met here |
| Whether proof of actual harm or injury is required for a claim | Damages can be inferred from the offensive intrusion | Actual compensable injury is required for a debt | Pennsylvania law requires evidence of actual harm; no such evidence was presented |
| Whether any resulting "debt" is nondischargeable in bankruptcy | The voicemail created a nondischargeable debt | No compensable injury, thus no debt exists | No injury, thus no actionable debt exists; § 523(a)(6) exceptions construed narrowly |
Key Cases Cited
- Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57 (holding that § 523(a)(6) requires a deliberate or intentional injury, not merely a deliberate act that leads to injury)
- Harris v. Easton Publ'g. Co., 483 A.2d 1377 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (Pennsylvania recognizes the tort of intrusion upon seclusion and requires substantial, highly offensive conduct)
- DeAngelo v. Fortney, 515 A.2d 594 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (clarifying that intrusion upon seclusion must be substantial and highly offensive to a reasonable person)
- Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (clarifying that state law determines the nature and validity of debts in bankruptcy)
- Chicarella v. Passant, 494 A.2d 1109 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (actionable intrusion upon seclusion requires proof of resulting mental suffering or humiliation)