9 F. Supp. 3d 1
D.D.C.2013Background
- Milton Holloway worked for D.C. Department of Solid Waste Collection from 1997 until his termination in August 2006; he had a history of disciplinary actions and absences.
- In March–June 2006 a hearing officer (Lloyd Carter) found Holloway was absent as charged but recommended 45 days suspension (not termination) because Holloway was in an employee assistance program.
- Holloway entered the Salvation Army long‑term substance‑abuse program in July 2006; he contends he (and his union rep) notified his supervisor and requested leave (including FMLA leave); the employer disputes sufficiency of notice.
- A deciding official rejected the hearing officer’s recommendation and Holloway’s employment was terminated on August 11, 2006; Holloway did not learn of the termination until May 2007.
- Holloway sued asserting (1) FMLA interference and retaliation and (2) a Fifth Amendment procedural‑due‑process violation. The District moved for summary judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether D.C. interfered with Holloway’s FMLA right to leave | Holloway says he and his union rep notified his supervisor and asked for leave to enter treatment, so employer put him on notice and then terminated him | D.C. says Holloway failed to follow notice procedures and did not give timely notice before entering the program | Genuine dispute of material fact exists as to notice; summary judgment denied on FMLA interference claim |
| Whether D.C. retaliated in violation of the FMLA | Holloway argues temporal proximity (July 2006 request → August 2006 termination) supports causation and retaliation | D.C. contends termination was for long history of unexcused absences predating the leave request | Court finds temporal proximity but plaintiff offered no additional evidence of pretext; retaliation claim dismissed (summary judgment for D.C.) |
| Whether Holloway was entitled to procedural due process before removal | Holloway contends he lacked adequate notice/opportunity to challenge the ultimate rejection of the hearing officer’s recommendation | D.C. points to pre‑termination notice, a neutral pre‑termination hearing, and available grievance procedures under the collective bargaining agreement | Court holds Holloway received sufficient process; due process claim dismissed (summary judgment for D.C.) |
| Whether Holloway was an ‘‘eligible employee’’ under the FMLA | Holloway alleges he worked >1250 hours in prior year; plaintiff says he meets eligibility | D.C. does not concede eligibility but produced no records to controvert plaintiff’s allegation | Treated as a disputed factual issue for trial on interference claim (no summary judgment on interference) |
Key Cases Cited
- Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (procedural‑due‑process balancing test)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (burden‑shifting framework for discrimination/retaliation claims)
- St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (plaintiff must show employer’s reason was false and discrimination was actual motive)
- Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (definition of materially adverse action)
- Roseboro v. Billington, 606 F. Supp. 2d 104 (substance abuse can qualify as serious health condition under FMLA)