Hollon v. Commonwealth
334 S.W.3d 431
| Ky. | 2011Background
- Hollon was convicted in 1996 of aggravated murder of Robbin White and sentenced to life without parole for 25 years.
- Hollon appealed and the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed in an unpublished decision.
- In 2000, Hollon, pro se, filed an RCr 11.42 motion alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel (IAAC) for not challenging the admissibility of his confession and for not raising a burglary aggravator issue.
- Franklin Circuit Court denied the motion in 2007, finding appellate counsel adequate.
- Court of Appeals dismissed Hollon’s IAAC claim as not cognizable under Hicks v. Commonwealth; the Supreme Court granted discretionary review to reconsider IAAC, ultimately holding IAAC claims may be pursued in the trial court under RCr 11.42 with prospective application; remand to Court of Appeals for merits of Hollon’s IAAC claim.
- The Court overruled Hicks’s distinction between merits-brief and no-merits-brief cases and adopted prospective IAAC review in RCr 11.42 proceedings, with guidance on procedure and final appellate review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether IAAC claims are cognizable in Kentucky courts. | Hollon argues IAAC claims are cognizable under Evitts and Smith and must be considered. | Commonwealth contends IAAC claims are not reviewable in trial court; Hicks controls. | IAAC claims are cognizable in Kentucky under RCr 11.42 (prospective relief). |
| What standard governs IAAC claims on direct appeal | Hollon contends appellate counsel’s performance must be deficient and prejudicial under Strickland. | Commonwealth argues existing Hicks framework suffices. | IAAC claims require deficient performance and prejudice analysis, applying Strickland standards. Must show omitted meritorious issue and prejudice. |
| Where IAAC claims should be raised | IAAC claims should be raised in trial court via RCr 11.42. | IAAC claims should be pursued in appellate court or habeas, not trial court. | Hollon may pursue Hicks-type IAAC claims in the trial court under RCr 11.42; trial court is first forum for such claims. |
| Prospective application and remedies | Rule should apply to Hollon’s case and future cases. | No retroactive effect; apply to new cases only. | Application is prospective; remand to Court of Appeals for merits consistent with opinion; does not retroactively disturb prior decisions. |
| Remand and procedural framework | IAAC issues should be considered with trial-record briefing. | No need to remand beyond addressing IAAC in trial court. | Remand to Court of Appeals to address merits of the IAAC claim within the RCr 11.42 framework; trial record briefs to be considered. |
Key Cases Cited
- Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (U.S. 1985) (right to effective appellate counsel extends to first appeal as of right)
- Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (U.S. 2000) (Merits brief and counsel's effectiveness; standard for IAAC claims includes prejudice)
- Hicks v. Commonwealth, 825 S.W.2d 280 (Ky. 1992) (Hicks-type IAAC claims previously not recognized; overruled for reform)
- Com. v. Wine, 694 S.W.2d 689 (Ky. 1985) (Trial court may address IAAC claims; limits on reopening direct appeal)
- Page v. United States, 884 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1989) (Trial court may address IAAC-like claims in postconviction context)
- Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (U.S. 1963) (Right to counsel on appeal; substantive advocacy importance)
- Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (U.S. 1967) (Counsel's duty in determining merit of appeal)
- Gray v. Greer, 800 F.2d 644 (7th Cir. 1986) (Standard for evaluating counsel's performance in IAAC)
- Boykin v. Webb, 541 F.3d 638 (6th Cir. 2008) (Federal precedent on IAAC pathways)