Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652

Background

In 2008 California courts recognized same-sex marriage; voters then adopted Proposition 8 amending the California Constitution to define marriage as between a man and a woman.
Two same-sex couples sued in federal court under the Fourteenth Amendment; state executive officials refused to defend Proposition 8, though they continued to enforce it.
The District Court allowed the official proponents of Proposition 8 to intervene; after a bench trial the court declared Proposition 8 unconstitutional and enjoined state officials from enforcing it.
State officials chose not to appeal; the private proponents (petitioners) appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which certified a question to the California Supreme Court about proponents’ authority to defend the initiative when officials decline.
The California Supreme Court held proponents are authorized under state law to assert the State’s interest and to appeal; relying on that, the Ninth Circuit found federal standing and affirmed on the merits (applying Romer v. Evans).
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to Article III standing and held petitioners lacked standing to appeal because they had no personal, particularized injury and could not assert the State’s interest in federal court simply by state-law authorization.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether petitioners (initiative proponents) had Article III standing to appeal after state officials declined to defend Proposition 8	Petitioners: California law authorizes them to represent the State’s interest; that authorization suffices for standing to defend and appeal	Respondents: Petitioners lack a personal, particularized injury; state-law authorization cannot confer Article III standing	Held: No standing — petitioners lacked an injury in fact and cannot assert the State’s interest in federal court merely by state-law authorization
Whether a private party may assert a State’s interest in federal court when public officials decline	Petitioners: State sovereign interest is harmed; States can designate who represents them; proponents are so designated under California law	Respondents: Ordinary rule bars litigants from asserting third-party rights; precedents require the party asserting state interest to have its own cognizable stake or be an authorized state officer	Held: Private proponents are not state officers/agents for Article III purposes; Diamond and Karcher limit such representation; proponents cannot invoke the State’s interest here
Whether California Supreme Court’s authorization makes proponents ‘‘agents of the people’’ for federal standing	Petitioners: California Supreme Court’s decision shows proponents are authorized agents, fulfilling Arizonans’ concern	Respondents: State decision only permits litigation participation; it does not create fiduciary/agency relationship required to satisfy Article III	Held: State-law authorization cannot override Article III; proponents are not agents with the required control, accountability, or fiduciary duties
Jurisdictional effect on Ninth Circuit merits decision	Petitioners: Ninth Circuit correctly accepted state-court answer and reached merits (Proposition 8 unconstitutional under Romer)	Respondents: Without Article III jurisdiction the Ninth Circuit lacked power to decide merits	Held: Ninth Circuit lacked jurisdiction; its judgment vacated and appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction

Key Cases Cited

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (standing requires concrete, particularized injury)
Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (private parties may not defend state laws on appeal absent their own injury)
Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72 (state officers may represent State under state law but lose standing when they no longer hold office)
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (expressing doubt that initiative sponsors are Article-III-qualified defenders absent state-law authorization)
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (Equal Protection analysis applied by Ninth Circuit on the merits)
Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (a State has a cognizable interest in continued enforceability of its laws)
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (courts must not usurp political branches; justiciability limits)
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (limits on judicial power to constitutional "cases or controversies")
Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270 (states act through agents and may designate representatives in litigation)