301 P.3d 264
Idaho2013Background
- This is an Idaho Supreme Court appeal challenging a district court order declaring Telford a vexatious litigant under ICA R59.
- An October 11, 2011 pre-filing order by Administrative District Judge Nye declared Telford vexatious based on prior vexatious determinations in multiple jurisdictions and three or more pro se litigations adversely decided in the past seven years in Idaho.
- The pre-filing order referenced vexatious declarations from Utah, Texas, the Ninth Circuit, the Idaho Federal District Court, Montana, and the U.S. Supreme Court.
- Telford received the pre-filing order by certified mail and filed a response challenging it, but the response did not address the bases for the order.
- Judge Nye issued a vexatious-litigant order on October 27, 2011, prohibiting Telford from filing new pro se actions in Idaho without leave and warning of contempt for noncompliance.
- On appeal, the issue is whether service, timing, and the judge’s exercise of discretion in declaring Telford vexatious were proper.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether service was proper and timely | Telford argues improper service or timing | Nye properly served via certified mail and timing followed ICA R59 | Service and timing were proper |
| Whether time to respond began at dispatch or delivery | Time began on delivery, or at least later than claimed | Time began upon dispatch or delivery; in any case timely response filed | Time to respond not errorfully elapsed before order |
| Whether the Administrative Judge abused discretion in declaring vexatious litigant | Judge Nye abused discretion by improper bases | Rule 59(d)(1) supports declaration using three pro se cases finally determined adversely in seven years | No abuse of discretion under ICA R59(d)(1) |
| Whether Rule 59 is unconstitutionally vague | Language like 'finally determined adversely' is vague | Term defined by ordinary meaning; not unconstitutionally vague | Rule 59 not unconstitutionally vague |
| Whether Telford received adequate due process | Procedural due process rights were violated by lack of records access and manipulation | Telford had notice and opportunity to be heard; protections were adequate | Adequate due process afforded |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Armstrong, 300 B.R. 799 (10th Cir. 2004) (abuse of discretion standard in sanctions as applied to bankruptcy context)
- Lee v. L.B. Sales, Inc., 177 F.3d 714 (8th Cir. 1999) (abuse of discretion standard in sanctions)
- De Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1990) (abuse of discretion in sanctions context)
- State Ins. Fund v. Jarolimek, 139 Idaho 137 (2003) (abuse of discretion standard for sanctions in Idaho)
- Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87 (1991) (sanctions standards under Idaho law)
- Glasco v. Brassard, 94 Idaho 162 (1971) (finality of judgment for determining final disposition)
- Farmers Equip. Co. v. Clinger, 70 Idaho 501 (1950) (finality standards in Idaho judgments)