Holland v. State
158 A.3d 452
| Del. | 2017Background
- On April 8, 2014, Djavon Holland entered an apartment, brandished a gun, demanded money, and a fight ensued in which occupants (including Nemesis Moore and Semaj Deshields) and Holland were injured. Police recovered marijuana and distribution paraphernalia in the apartment and text messages from Holland indicating he sought money.
- First indictment charged Home Invasion, Assault First Degree (as to Moore and Deshields) and related counts; trial 1 resulted in acquittals on the Assault First Degree counts and a hung jury on remaining counts.
- After trial 1 the State re-presented to a grand jury and obtained a second indictment adding three counts of Attempted Robbery First Degree (and predicate Home Invasion tied to Attempted Robbery) plus many of the unresolved/related counts.
- At trial 2 Holland was convicted of two Attempted Robbery counts (and several other counts) but later appealed, arguing (a) 11 Del. C. § 208 barred the new charges, (b) estoppel/collateral estoppel prevented proving elements of Attempted Robbery, (c) the reindictment was vindictive prosecution, and (d) his pro se waiver at trial 2 was invalid.
- The Delaware Supreme Court: rejected Holland’s statutory § 208 and estoppel arguments, accepted his vindictive-prosecution claim as to the new Attempted Robbery/Home Invasion (and related firearm) convictions, and rejected his Sixth Amendment waiver challenge—reversing the Attempted Robbery, Home Invasion, and related felony firearm convictions but leaving other convictions intact.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Holland) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 11 Del. C. § 208 barred reindictment on Attempted Robbery after acquittal on Assault First Degree | §208 does not bar the new charges because Attempted Robbery was not an offense of which Holland could have been convicted under the first indictment; (1)(b)(1) permits prosecution where second offense requires proof of a fact not required by the former offense | §208(1)(a) bars any prosecution for offenses that could have been prosecuted/convicted in the first prosecution (including charges not actually indicted then) | Court: Rejects Holland. Interprets §208 to permit the new charges under (1)(b)(1); Holland’s expansive reading would nullify (1)(b)(1) and import omitted MPC language. |
| Whether collateral estoppel/estoppel prevents the State from proving elements of Attempted Robbery of Moore because of prior acquittal on Assault First Degree | State: Acquittal on Assault did not necessarily resolve facts inconsistent with Attempted Robbery; §208(1)(b)(1) allows reprosecution because Attempted Robbery requires different facts; §208(2) not triggered | Holland: Prior acquittal on Assault and related firearm count estops State from proving Holland caused Moore’s injury or possessed a firearm for the Attempted Robbery charge | Court: Rejects Holland. Finds Attempted Robbery and Assault require different elements; §208(1)(b)(1) and §208(2) permit the second prosecution; estoppel claim fails (and was not properly preserved). |
| Whether prosecution was vindictive (federal due process) in reindicting with Attempted Robbery after hung/inconclusive first trial | State: New charges appropriate because Moore’s trial testimony (that he was a drug dealer at the time) was critical; any presumption can be rebutted by showing reasons for delay | Holland: Reindictment after an inconclusive first trial—on similarly weighty charges that could have been brought earlier—creates a presumption of vindictiveness; the State cannot overcome the presumption because it had circumstantial evidence before trial 1 | Court: Holds presumption of vindictiveness applies. State failed to show legitimate reason it could not have presented Attempted Robbery at trial 1. Reverses convictions for Attempted Robbery, Home Invasion (predicated on Attempted Robbery), and related firearm counts. |
| Whether Holland’s waiver of counsel at trial 2 was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary | State: Superior Court properly conducted colloquy (Welty factors) and reasonably relied on prior colloquy; waiver was valid | Holland: Second colloquy improperly incorporated earlier colloquy without confirming recollection; court failed to address all Welty factors expressly (e.g., specific offenses, sentence ranges, dual-role risks) | Court: Rejects Holland. Overall colloquies (first and second, before same judge) adequately addressed material Welty considerations; waiver was valid and convictions not reversed on that ground. |
Key Cases Cited
- Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974) (reindictment on more serious charges after exercise of rights gives rise to presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness)
- North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) (due process concerns about vindictiveness in sentencing/retrial contexts)
- United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185 (3d Cir. 1982) (framework/colloquy guidance for determining knowing, intelligent, voluntary pro se waiver)
- Johnson v. State, 396 A.2d 163 (Del. 1978) (applies Blackledge presumption to enlarged indictment after mistrial/retrial)
- Briscoe v. State, 606 A.2d 103 (Del. 1992) (adoption of Welty inquiry and guidance on pro se waiver)