Holland v. Caviness, 292 Ga. 332

Caviness was injured in a 2004 train accident and retained counsel Holland to sue CSX in Alabama; summary judgment was granted against Caviness on statute-of-limitations grounds, which Caviness learned about in December 2007.
Caviness later pursued legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty claims in Georgia; the case was removed to the SDGa and the district court granted summary judgment on the malpractice claim but denied on the breach claim.
The district court found the remaining injury was to Caviness’s peace, happiness, or feelings, making OCGA § 51-12-6 applicable and barring evidence of worldly circumstances at trial.
At trial Caviness admitted evidence of worldly wealth and status of Holland’s firm and principals, including multi-million-dollar income and several luxury assets.
The jury awarded Caviness $700,000; Holland moved for a new trial which the district court denied with leave to renew pending the Supreme Court’s certified question decision.
OCGA § 51-12-6 was amended in 1987; current version bars punitive damages under § 51-12-5/5.1 when the action is focused on the plaintiff’s peace, happiness, or feelings, and eliminates worldly-circumstances evidence in such actions.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether worldly circumstances are admissible in peace-only injuries.	Caviness contends pre-1987 law may apply; Jolts are permissible under old rule.	Post-1987 statute precludes such evidence in § 51-12-6 actions.	No; post-1987 version precludes admission.
Does the 1987 Act coherently replace prior law on punitive and related damages?	Old logic remains; § 51-12-6 could still allow punishment-based evidence.	Legislative scheme unified; § 51-12-6 excludes worldly-circumstances evidence when injury is only to feelings.	Coherent scheme; 1987 Act controls.
Is Tahamtan still valid after the 1987 changes?	Tahamtan supports admission of worldly circumstances.	Tahamtan misapplied; post-1987 version governs.	Overruled to the extent Tahamtan implies admissibility; overruled.

Lombardi, Inc. v. Smithfield, 11 A.3d 1180 (Del. 1989) (irreparable harm is the most important factor for a preliminary injunction)
Hearth Admins., Corp v. City of New York, 394 F.3d 382 (2d. Cir. 2012) (public policy arguments rarely factor heavily into the outcome of a motion for preliminary injunction)
Barzingus v. Wilheim, 306 F.3d 17 (10th Cir. 2010) (motion to compel arbitration standard is similar to summary judgment standard)
Northwestern Univ. v. Crisp, 211 Ga. 636 (1955) (general rule about wealth and worldly circumstances in tort cases)
Bailey v. Edmundson, 280 Ga. 528 (2006) (wealth or worldly circumstances generally not admissible)
Westview Cemetery v. Blanchard, 234 Ga. 540 (1975) (injury limited to peace, happiness, or feelings reduces damages considerations)
Tolleson v. Posey, 32 Ga. 372 (1861) (early consideration of defendant's wealth in damages)
Cherry v. McCall, 23 Ga. 193 (1857) (explanation of vindictive damages in early tort law)
Couch v. Red Roof Inns, 291 Ga. 359 (2012) (statutory preemption of common-law remnants in derogation context)
Tahamtan v. Tahamtan, 204 Ga. App. 680 (1992) ( erroneously relied on pre-1987 law for post-1987 actions; overruled)
Brunswick Gas & Fuel Co. v. Parrish, 179 Ga. App. 495 (1986) (early view on worldly circumstances in pre-1987 context)