Holder v. Sessions, 848 F.3d 500

Holder, a lawful permanent resident, committed kidnapping for ransom in May 1990; the offense made him deportable as an aggravated felony.
At the time of the offense, § 212(c) waivers could be granted; six months later Congress enacted IMMACT (Nov. 1990), which barred § 212(c) relief for aliens convicted of aggravated felonies who served ≥5 years.
Holder was convicted in December 1990 (after IMMACT) and sought § 212(c) relief during removal proceedings after his release in 2014.
The BIA denied § 212(c) relief, treating IMMACT’s disqualification as applicable because Holder’s conviction postdated IMMACT’s enactment.
Holder challenged that application as impermissibly retroactive because his underlying criminal conduct occurred before IMMACT’s enactment.
The First Circuit reviewed whether (1) Congress clearly intended IMMACT to apply retrospectively and (2) applying IMMACT to Holder would produce an impermissible retroactive effect, but ultimately relied on circuit precedent treating the date of conviction as controlling.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether IMMACT’s bar to § 212(c) relief is impermissibly retroactive when the criminal conduct predated IMMACT but conviction postdated it	Holder: statute is retroactive as applied because underlying offense occurred before IMMACT; Congress did not clearly indicate retrospective application	Government/BIA: statute applies to convictions entered after enactment; conviction date controls eligibility	Held: Denial of § 212(c) relief was not impermissibly retroactive; conviction date controls eligibility per First Circuit precedent (Lawrence, Cruz-Bucheli)
Whether Vartelas requires using date of offense rather than conviction to assess retroactivity	Holder: Vartelas’ references to "events" (offense, plea, conviction, punishment) show offense date can control	Government/BIA: Vartelas is conviction-centric and does not displace First Circuit precedent	Held: Vartelas does not clearly compel abandoning conviction-date rule; First Circuit precedent remains controlling

I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (framework for analyzing statutory retroactivity in immigration context)
Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994) (general test for impermissible retroactivity)
Vartelas v. Holder, 566 U.S. 257 (2012) (applied conviction-date rule to IIRIRA provision; language sometimes references multiple "events")
Barreiro v. I.N.S., 989 F.2d 62 (1st Cir. 1993) (held IMMACT intended to narrow § 212(c) applicability post-enactment)
Lawrence v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 221 (1st Cir. 2006) (date of conviction, not date of conduct, controls § 212(c) eligibility)
Cruz-Bucheli v. Gonzales, 463 F.3d 105 (1st Cir. 2006) (per curiam; reaffirming conviction-date rule)
Centurion v. Holder, 755 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 2014) (reads Vartelas as conviction-centered and rejects offense-date rule)