Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez
132 S. Ct. 2011
| SCOTUS | 2012Background
- 8 U.S.C. §1229b(a) sets three criteria for cancellation of removal, including five years of lawful permanent residence and seven years of continuous residence after a lawful admission.
- Whether the Board of Immigration Appeals may impute a parent’s years of continuous residence or LPR status to a child is the central issue.
- Gutierrez (10–1542) entered illegally with family in 1989 at age 5; father later became an LPR; Gutierrez did not have LPR status until 2003 and later faced removal for smuggling.
- Sawyers (10–1543) was admitted as an LPR in 1995 at age 15; his mother had six years of residency; after a 2002 drug offense, the government pursued removal and challenged whether maternal residency could count toward seven years.
- The BIA had rejected imputation; the Ninth Circuit held imputation permissible; this Court reversed, holding the BIA’s no-imputation rule is a permissible construction of §1229b(a).
- The decision centers on statutory text, history, and Chevron deference to agency interpretations.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| May a parent’s continuous residence or LPR status be imputed to a child for §1229b(a)? | Gutierrez/Sawyers urged imputation under §1229b(a). | Board and Government argue no imputation; each alien must meet §1229b(a) independently. | Imputation is not required; Board's no-imputation rule is permissible. |
| Does §1229b(a) authorize imputation by its text or context/history require it? | Statutory history supports imputation due to prior §212(c) practice. | Statutory text does not mention imputation; history does not compel it. | Statute does not mandate imputation; text and history permit no imputation. |
| Should Chevron deference be afforded to the Board's interpretation of §1229b(a)? | Board’s interpretation conflicts with some circuits; argues for deference to agency expertise. | Board’s interpretation is a reasonable construction deserving Chevron deference. | Board’s interpretation is entitled to Chevron deference. |
| Do INA purposes require imputation for family unity considerations? | Imputation furthers family unity and relief goals. | INA has multiple goals; silent statute cannot be read to require imputation. | INA goals do not compel imputation; silent statute allows non-imputation. |
Key Cases Cited
- Cuevas-Gaspar v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2005) (imputation of parent’s residence to child under §212(c) context)
- Mercado-Zazueta v. Holder, 580 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2009) (upholds imputation approach under §1229b(a))
- Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335 (U.S. 2005) (ratification doctrine; statutory reenactment guidance)
- Judulang v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2416 (U.S. 2013) (Chevron deference framework and agency interpretations)
- INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (U.S. 1999) (Chevron deference and INA interpretations)
- Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967 (U.S. 2005) (statutory interpretation and agency deference context)