74 F.4th 371
5th Cir.2023Background
- Hogan paid tuition and mandatory fees for SMU's Spring 2020 in‑person semester; SMU moved to remote instruction mid‑semester due to COVID‑19.
- Hogan graduated but sued on behalf of a putative class seeking refunds, alleging breach of contract (and alternate claims) because SMU failed to provide promised in‑person educational experiences described in marketing and the Student Agreement.
- SMU removed to federal court and moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim and, alternatively, argued Texas’s Pandemic Liability Protection Act (PLPA) retroactively bars monetary relief.
- The district court dismissed Hogan’s complaint with prejudice, finding inadequate contractual pleading and that the PLPA constitutionally barred damages.
- The Fifth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the breach‑of‑contract claim in light of King v. Baylor University, concluding the complaint sufficiently raised a plausible ambiguity about whether the contract required in‑person instruction.
- Because the PLPA’s retroactive effect on Hogan’s damages raises an unsettled Texas constitutional question, the Fifth Circuit certified that question to the Texas Supreme Court.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adequacy of breach‑of‑contract pleading | Hogan: Student Agreement and university materials promised in‑person educational experiences; "educational purposes" includes on‑campus instruction | SMU: Agreement does not specifically guarantee in‑person classes; phrase is not an enforceable promise | Court: Reversed dismissal; per King, ambiguous term and surrounding circumstances must be examined on remand |
| PLPA retroactivity v. Texas Constitution | Hogan: PLPA retroactively strips settled expectations and violates art. I, §16 (retroactivity clause) | SMU: Legislature had compelling public interest; PLPA is remedial and permissibly limits damages; plaintiffs lacked settled expectations | Court: Issue is close and unsettled under Texas law; certified the constitutional question to the Texas Supreme Court |
| Applicability of educational‑malpractice doctrine | Hogan: Claim alleges breach of an objective contractual promise, not educational quality | SMU: Doctrine bars claims based on dissatisfaction with education | Court: Rejected application here (Jones precedent); breach claim is not educational malpractice |
Key Cases Cited
- King v. Baylor Univ., 46 F.4th 344 (5th Cir. 2022) (contract ambiguity over "educational services" requires factual inquiry)
- Jones v. Adm’rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 51 F.4th 101 (5th Cir. 2022) (similar claims against universities; breach‑of‑contract approach)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2009) (federal pleading standard for plausibility)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (U.S. 2007) (pleading must state a plausible claim)
- Robinson v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 335 S.W.3d 126 (Tex. 2010) (Texas test and guidance on retroactivity and settled expectations)
- Fire Prot. Serv., Inc. v. Survitec Survival Prods., Inc., 649 S.W.3d 197 (Tex. 2022) (Texas Supreme Court discussion of retroactivity and the Robinson factors)