Hogan v. District Attorney's Office of Richmond County, 1:12-cv-00127

Hogan, proceeding IFP, filed a civil rights action in the Southern District of Georgia against the Richmond County District Attorney's Office, Barbara A. Smith, Donald Evans, and Cleon Walden.
Plaintiff alleges Walden questioned him about a robbery, coerced information, and used that to charge him with armed robbery; he claims void affidavits/arrest warrants and void judgments.
Smith allegedly knew the related affidavits/arrest warrant were illegal and kept the document in her office; Evans allegedly knew Hogan was imprisoned for a crime he hadn't been arrested for committing.
Plaintiff contends the District Attorney's Office is liable because Smith acted as its representative.
Plaintiff seeks a jury trial, monetary damages, and removal of his conviction from the record; the court screens the complaint as an IFP matter and considers dismissal.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Heck bars §1983 wrongful-imprisonment claims.	Hogan asserts unconstitutional imprisonment supports §1983 damages/relief.	Defendants contend Heck bars claims seeking damages tied to conviction.	Heck bars §1983 claim that attacks conviction; dismissal warranted.
Whether Smith is entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity.	Smith's actions as prosecutor violated rights.	Prosecutors have absolute immunity for advocacy-related acts.	Smith entitled to absolute immunity; claim against Smith fails.
Whether Evans, as court-appointed counsel, can be a state actor under §1983.	Evans deprived Hogan of rights in the underlying case.	Attorneys, even when appointed, do not act under color of state law.	Evans not a state actor; §1983 claim against Evans dismissed.
Whether the District Attorney's Office is amenable to §1983 liability.	Office as an entity caused constitutional deprivation.	Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state offices/arms; no individual wrongdoing established.	DA's Office shielded by Eleventh Amendment; no viable §1983 claim.
Whether the claims are time-barred by the statute of limitations.	Claims relate to 1990 incidents; timely asserts.	Georgia two-year limitations; accrual occurred in 1990.	Claims time-barred; outside two-year window.
Whether the FTCA is properly pled and viable.	FTCA asserted as basis for relief.	No federal action by named defendants; FTCA inadequately pleaded.	FTCA claims not stated; dismissed.

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (U.S. 1994) (bar§1983 claims that would imply invalidity of conviction)
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (U.S. 1973) (challenge to conditions vs. duration of confinement)
Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637 (U.S. 2004) (core habeas vs. civil rights distinction for claims)
Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157 (11th Cir. 2003) (damages/claims tied to conviction not cognizable under §1983)
Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497 (U.S. Supreme Court 2012) (prosecutorial actions and absolute immunity in §1983 actions)
Rivera v. Leal, 359 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 2004) (prosecutors' acts as advocates; absolute immunity)
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (U.S. 1988) (color of state law requirement for §1983 action)
Rozar v. Mullis, 85 F.3d 556 (11th Cir. 1996) (accrual and limitations in §1983 actions)
Brown v. Ga. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 335 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. 2003) (statutory accrual and limitations guidance)
Pugh v. Alabama, 438 U.S. 782 (U.S. 1978) (Eleventh Amendment immunity for state entities)