Hoffner v. Lanctoe
290 Mich. App. 449
Mich. Ct. App.2010Background
- Hoffner slipped on glare ice on the sidewalk in front of Fitness Xpress, where she had joined about two weeks earlier and entered via the facility's only customer entrance.
- The trial court denied summary disposition on issues of possession/control of the sidewalk, the release's scope, and the nature of the icy condition; the appellate court granted partial affirmation, partial reversal, and remand.
- Defendants argued they lacked possession/control of the sidewalk; the court reviewed the issue de novo under MCR 2.116(C)(10).
- Lease terms allegedly assigned responsibility for snow/ice removal to the Lanctoes, while Fitness Xpress had some salt use and the building housed multiple businesses.
- The release between Hoffner and Fitness Xpress was alleged to broadly discharge liability, but the contract language was found ambiguous and subject to interpretation with respect to Lanctoe liability.
- Open and obvious danger doctrine was raised, with ice characterized as an open/obvious danger but potentially a special aspect making it unreasonably dangerous.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Possession and control of the sidewalk | Plaintiff argues defendants possessed/controlled the sidewalk via lease and conduct. | Defendants contend they lacked possession/control of the sidewalk. | Defendants lacked possession/control; summary disposition for lack of duty. |
| Scope of Hoffner's release | Release broadly discharges liability reached by broad language incl. all others. | Release may apply to Lanctoes; contract ambiguous, requiring factual development. | Release scope ambiguous; summary disposition improper for Lanctoes. |
| Open and obvious danger and special aspects | Ice was open/obvious but potentially a special aspect making it unreasonably dangerous. | If avoidable, no special aspect; danger not unavoidably on premises. | Ice could be an effectively unavoidable condition; open/obvious does not bar claim as to premises duty. |
Key Cases Cited
- Orel v Uni-Rak Sales Co, 454 Mich 564 (1997) (possession/control required for premises liability duty)
- Derbabian v S & C Snowplowing, Inc, 249 Mich App 695 (2002) (possession/control definitions; dominion over property)
- Merritt v Nickelson, 407 Mich 544 (1980) (definition of possessor of land; liability based on possession/control)
- Lugo v Ameritech Corp, Inc, 464 Mich 512 (2001) (special aspect doctrine; effectively unavoidable danger)
- Robertson v Blue Water Oil Co, 268 Mich App 588 (2005) (unavoidability of condition when inviting premises; invitee duty)
- Stitt v Holland Abundant Life Fellowship, 462 Mich 591 (2000) (invitee status and duty of care)
- Meagher v Wayne State Univ, 222 Mich App 700 (1997) (contract-based release ambiguity; summary disposition proper only with clear language)
- Shay v Aldrich, 487 Mich 648 (2010) (latent ambiguity and third-party beneficiary interpretation of releases)
- Skotak v Vic Tanny Int'l, Inc, 203 Mich App 616 (1994) (broad release language and interpretation principles)