813 S.E.2d 292
S.C. Ct. App.2018Background
- Mable Hodge, a competent patient, was admitted to UniHealth Post-Acute Care of Bamberg; her husband signed an Admission Agreement and a separate Arbitration Agreement the day before her admission while she remained in the hospital.
- The Arbitration Agreement: separately paginated, had its own signature page, stated arbitration was not a precondition to admission, could be revoked within 30 days, and declared it was governed by the Federal Arbitration Act.
- Mable signed other admission-related documents at the facility on arrival but did not sign the Arbitration Agreement; she had no health-care or general power of attorney.
- After complications at the facility left Mable paralyzed and later deceased, her husband (loss of consortium) and son (personal representative of the estate) sued the facility and parents; the facility moved to compel arbitration and to depose the husband on arbitration-related issues.
- The circuit court denied the motions (to compel arbitration and to compel husband’s deposition); the court of appeals affirmed, rejecting arguments based on unpublished precedent reliance, equitable estoppel, agency, third‑party beneficiary status, and abuse-of-discretion in denying the deposition.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Arbitration Agreement binds the estate/personal representative | Estate/Hodge argue the arbitration agreement was not signed by Mable and thus unenforceable against the estate | Appellants argue the husband’s signature binds the estate (intertwined claims) and that prior cases support enforcement | Court: Agreement unenforceable against estate; arbitrability is a judicial issue and facts supported denial to compel arbitration |
| Equitable estoppel to force arbitration | Appellants: estate is estopped from denying arbitration because admission and arbitration agreements merged and parties benefited | Respondents: agreements are separate; arbitration was voluntary and not a condition to admission; no benefit from arbitration was accepted by Mable/estate | Court: No merger; equitable estoppel does not apply (following Coleman and Thompson) |
| Common-law or apparent agency (husband binding Mable) | Appellants: Husband acted as Mable’s agent (signed previous healthcare documents) and thus could sign arbitration agreement | Respondents: No express authority, no power of attorney, Mable competent and signed other forms; apparent authority requires principal’s manifestations | Court: No actual or apparent agency to sign arbitration (signing healthcare or billing forms does not authorize waiving jury/court rights) |
| Whether trial court abused discretion by denying deposition of husband | Appellants: Husband’s testimony could show agency and authority to bind Mable | Respondents: Facts were undisputed and documents in record; deposition would not add material facts | Court: Denial affirmed — deposition would not produce additional material facts and denial was not an abuse of discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- Zabinski v. Bright Acres Assocs., [citation="346 S.C. 580, 553 S.E.2d 110"] (S.C. 2001) (arbitrability is a judicial question)
- Aiken v. World Fin. Corp. of S.C., [citation="373 S.C. 144, 644 S.E.2d 705"] (S.C. 2007) (appellate review standards for arbitrability and deference to factual findings)
- Coleman v. Mariner Health Care, Inc., [citation="407 S.C. 346, 755 S.E.2d 450"] (S.C. 2014) (separate arbitration agreement language, revocability, and choice-of-law support non-merger)
- Dean v. Heritage Healthcare of Ridgeway, LLC, [citation="408 S.C. 371, 759 S.E.2d 727"] (S.C. 2014) (remand required to inquire into whether patient or signatory had authority to sign)
- Thompson v. Pruitt Corp., [citation="416 S.C. 43, 784 S.E.2d 679"] (S.C. 2016) (equitable estoppel and agency analyses: authority to sign healthcare forms does not necessarily permit waiver of jury/court rights)
- Dickerson v. Longoria, [citation="414 Md. 419, 995 A.2d 721"] (Md. 2010) (signing free‑standing arbitration agreement is not a health‑care decision where agreement is optional; limited agency for healthcare decisions does not include waiver of legal rights)