Hoard v. Beveridge, 298 Ga. 728

Background

Beveridge filed for divorce from Hoard in 2009; custody of their one minor child was the primary dispute.
The court appointed custody evaluator Dr. Carol Webb, who recommended joint custody; Hoard repeatedly moved to disqualify Webb based on a past request she made for a recommendation letter.
After a ten-day trial, the court entered a final order granting joint legal and physical custody and stated it did not rely on Webb’s report for the custody decision.
Both parties sought attorney fees: Hoard sought $431,411.25; Beveridge sought $400,974.90. The trial court awarded Beveridge $232,114 (the exact amount he claimed post-temporary hearing and after denial of Hoard’s first disqualification motion).
The trial court characterized Hoard’s disqualification efforts as unnecessarily expanding litigation and premised fee relief on both OCGA § 9-15-14(b) (sanctions/expansion of litigation) and OCGA § 19-6-2(a) (divorce-related fee awards after considering parties’ finances).
Hoard appealed, arguing the court erred by failing to allocate which portion of the award was under each statute and that the findings did not independently support the full award under either statute.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Hoard)	Defendant's Argument (Beveridge)	Held
Whether trial court erred by not allocating fee award between OCGA § 9-15-14(b) and OCGA § 19-6-2(a)	Trial court must specify allocation; without allocation award cannot be upheld because findings insufficient for either statute alone	Award may stand if the full award is independently sustainable under at least one statute	Court affirmed: allocation not required where full award is independently sustainable under OCGA § 19-6-2(a)
Whether the fee award is supportable under OCGA § 9-15-14(b) (fees for sanctionable/expansive conduct)	Hoard argued the full $232,114 cannot be sustained as sanction-related fees; trial court made no specific allocation	Beveridge relied on trial court’s finding that Hoard’s repeated motions unnecessarily expanded litigation	Court held § 9-15-14(b) could not sustain the full award because evidence showed sanction-related fees did not exceed about $65,000
Whether the fee award is supportable under OCGA § 19-6-2(a) (divorce-context fee award based on financial circumstances)	Hoard contended award improperly punitive or based on misconduct and argued reliance on older financial data was improper	Beveridge argued trial court considered both parties’ financial circumstances and adjusted award downward; court has broad discretion under § 19-6-2(a)	Court upheld full award under § 19-6-2(a): record showed trial court considered incomes, assets, obligations, and did not abuse discretion
Whether fee award was punitive or improperly based on misconduct	Hoard asserted the court actually punished her for misconduct via § 19-6-2 award	Beveridge maintained the § 19-6-2 award focused on need and relative ability to pay, not punishment	Court found no indication § 19-6-2 award was punitive; order focused on financial circumstances, so award stands

Key Cases Cited

Park Ridge Condo Ass’n v. Callais, 290 Ga. App. 875 (trial court must specify which fees fall within a fee statute)
Taylor v. Taylor, 293 Ga. 615 (an award may stand where full amount would be authorized under either statute)
Hardman v. Hardman, 295 Ga. 732 (fees under OCGA § 9-15-14(b) must be limited to those incurred defending sanctionable conduct)
LabMD, Inc. v. Savera, 331 Ga. App. 463 (trial court must limit § 9-15-14(b) award to fees caused by sanctionable conduct)
Trotter v. Summerour, 273 Ga. App. 263 (fees unrelated to frivolous claims must be excluded from § 9-15-14 awards)
Simmons v. Simmons, 288 Ga. 670 (OCGA § 19-6-2 authorizes fee awards in divorce after considering financial circumstances)
Mongerson v. Mongerson, 285 Ga. 554 (trial court discretion on § 19-6-2 awards will not be reversed absent abuse)
Patel v. Patel, 285 Ga. 391 (no abuse in denying fees where parties used marital property to pay fees)
Johnson v. Johnson, 284 Ga. 366 (broad discretion to set amount and terms of fees under § 19-6-2)
Brady v. Brady, 228 Ga. 617 (trial court discretion on fee amounts under § 19-6-2 not disturbed absent abuse)