41 F.4th 1109
9th Cir.2022Background
- Plaintiff Hitoshi Yoshikawa, a Japanese national and Hawaii resident, renovated waterfront property that included a prior nonconforming structure within a shoreline setback.
- City building inspector Troy Seguirant inspected the project repeatedly, issued Notices of Violation and a Notice of Order alleging the work exceeded permits and required a new permit; the Board of Building Appeals (BBA) later found violations.
- While work proceeded, Seguirant was overheard using the term “haoles” and saying he tried to “keep it local,” statements Yoshikawa alleges show racial animus.
- Yoshikawa sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging discriminatory enforcement that interfered with his right to contract with his (white) architect and contractor.
- The district court denied Seguirant’s motion to dismiss and denied qualified immunity; Seguirant appealed the denial of qualified immunity to the Ninth Circuit.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Yoshikawa pleaded a § 1981 claim (but-for causation) | Alleged statements of racial animus plus repeated inspections/violations show enforcement was motivated by race and thus satisfy Comcast’s but-for requirement | BBA’s finding of ordinance violations provides an independent nondiscriminatory reason, so Yoshikawa cannot show race was the but-for cause | Court: Complaint plausibly alleges that enforcement, though facially lawful, was motivated by race; but-for causation can be shown by discriminatory enforcement allegations (Comcast applied) |
| Whether an independent lawful reason (BBA Order) defeats § 1981 at pleading stage | Even if regulations were violated, discriminatory enforcement can still be the but-for cause of the injury | The BBA Order establishes non-discriminatory grounds that preclude a § 1981 claim | Court: A lawful violation does not automatically preclude a § 1981 claim—Yick Wo/GBC history shows discriminatory enforcement of neutral laws can violate § 1981 |
| Whether Seguirant is entitled to qualified immunity because law was not clearly established (McDonnell Douglas split) | Circuit split over McDonnell Douglas fourth prong in non-employment cases makes elements unclear; thus Seguirant lacked fair notice | The right to be free from intentional racial discrimination in governmental enforcement is clearly established; McDonnell Douglas is an evidentiary tool, not a pleading or notice requirement | Court: Qualified immunity denied. The right was clearly established; applying McDonnell Douglas at the pleading stage was unnecessary and inapt for the notice inquiry |
Key Cases Cited
- Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n Afr.-Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009 (2020) (§ 1981 requires but-for causation for race-based claims)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (burden-shifting framework for proving discrimination)
- Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002) (McDonnell Douglas is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement)
- Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (facially neutral law applied discriminatorily violates equal protection)
- Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982) (§ 1981 targets discriminatory enforcement of neutral laws)
- Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701 (1989) (scope of § 1981 remedies vis-à-vis § 1983)
- Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) (qualified immunity two-step framework)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (flexibility in sequencing qualified immunity analysis)
- Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 575 U.S. 206 (2015) (McDonnell Douglas not exclusive; direct or indirect evidence may prove discrimination)