Hitchcock v. Cumberland University 403(b) DC Plan
851 F.3d 552
| 6th Cir. | 2017Background
- Plaintiffs Eloise Hitchcock and Sheryl Kae were participants in Cumberland University’s 403(b) defined-contribution plan; the Plan previously promised a 5% employer match but was amended to make matching discretionary effective January 1, 2013.
- The University announced zero employer matching for 2013–14 and 2014–15 and did not produce an updated Summary Plan Description nor provide formal written notice of the amendment as Plaintiffs requested.
- Plaintiffs filed a putative class action alleging (1) wrongful denial of benefits (ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B)), (2) anti-cutback violation (ERISA § 1054(g)), (3) failure to provide notice (ERISA § 502(a)(3)), and (4) breach of fiduciary duty (ERISA § 1104).
- The district court treated defendants’ post-answer Rule 12 motion as a Rule 12(c) motion and dismissed the entire case without prejudice so Plaintiffs could administratively exhaust; it also dismissed the notice claim for failure to state a claim.
- The Sixth Circuit reversed: it held it had jurisdiction over the appeal, concluded statutory ERISA claims (like anti-cutback and fiduciary-duty claims) do not require administrative exhaustion, and found dismissal of the notice claim premature given lack of discovery and Plaintiffs’ opposition.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Appellate jurisdiction over dismissal without prejudice plus final judgment | District court dismissed entire action and Plaintiffs intended to stand on the complaint; appeal permissible under § 1291 | Dismissal without prejudice is non-final and not appealable | Court held jurisdiction existed because the district court dismissed the entire action and entered final judgment, making the order appealable |
| Whether statutory ERISA claims (anti-cutback, fiduciary duty) require administrative exhaustion | No exhaustion required; these claims challenge plan legality and invoke statutory rights under ERISA | Exhaustion required; defendants urged adopting a nuanced or Third Circuit approach | Court held exhaustion is not required for statutory ERISA claims and Counts II and IV were statutory, not plan-based, claims |
| Standing to sue under ERISA | Hitchcock and Kae were participants during the amendment period and thus have standing | Plaintiffs did not plead they made contributions during the relevant period so standing lacking | Court held Plaintiffs were participants under ERISA and have standing because employment overlapped the amendment period |
| Dismissal of notice claim (Count III) for failure to state a claim | Plaintiffs argued dismissal premature because they lacked discovery needed to plead notice details | Defendants argued Plaintiffs failed to plead with particularity and did not respond to dismissal motion | Court held dismissal was erroneous: Plaintiffs opposed the motion and sought discovery; district court should have allowed discovery or amendment rather than dismissing |
Key Cases Cited
- Central Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Heinz, 541 U.S. 739 (Sup. Ct. 2004) (ERISA’s protection of participants’ reasonable expectations regarding promised benefits)
- Costantino v. TRW, Inc., 13 F.3d 969 (6th Cir. 1994) (exhaustion futile where suit challenges legality of retroactive plan amendment)
- Durand v. Hanover Ins. Group, Inc., 560 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2009) (no exhaustion required when suit challenges legality of plan methodology rather than its interpretation)
- Fallick v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 162 F.3d 410 (6th Cir. 1998) (ERISA has an implied exhaustion requirement for benefits claims)
- Stephens v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 755 F.3d 959 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (exhaustion not required for statutory fiduciary claims; judicial expertise in statutory interpretation)
- Zipf v. AT & T, 799 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1986) (distinguishing plan-based claims from statutory claims; Section 503 applies to benefit claims)
- Thornton v. Graphic Commc’ns Conference, 566 F.3d 597 (6th Cir. 2009) (anti-cutback rule protects accrued benefits)
- Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165 (3d Cir. 2000) (finality principles for appealability)
- Clemens Tr. v. Morgan Stanley DW, Inc., 485 F.3d 840 (6th Cir. 2007) (when dismissal of entire action without prejudice may be treated as final for appeal)
- Yeager v. United States, 303 F.3d 661 (6th Cir. 2002) (court of appeals independently evaluates appellate jurisdiction)
- Mason v. Continental Group, 763 F.2d 1219 (11th Cir. 1985) (discussing exhaustion requirement for statutory claims)
